

PARTNERSHIPS, POLITICS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:

**A CASE STUDY OF THE
ONTARIO MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES**

by:

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ABSTRACT

Efforts to reform the public sector reflect the social, political and economic environment within which government must function. The recent demands by the public for more consensual decision-making, as well as more efficient, effective and responsive public service, have resulted in a number of reform initiatives, including an emphasis on partnership development.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine partnership arrangements within the public sector. Specifically, the thesis will assess the value of partnerships and their impact on government by examining six partnership arrangements involving the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR). The OMNR, having recently been awarded the 1992 Institute of Public Administration of Canada Award for Innovative Management, on the theme of partnership development, is being lauded as an example for other government agencies considering similar alliances.

The thesis begins by introducing the concept and practice of partnership within the public sector in general and the OMNR specifically. Descriptive analysis of six OMNR partnerships is provided and a number of criteria are used to determine the success of each of these arrangements. Special attention is paid to the political implications of partnerships and to those attributes which appear to contribute to the successful establishment and

maintenance of partnership arrangements.

The conclusion is drawn that partnerships provide the government with an opportunity to address public demands for greater involvement in decision-making while accommodating government's limited financial resources. However, few truly collaborative partnerships exist within the public sector. There are also significant political implications associated with partnerships which must be dealt with both at the political and bureaucratic levels of government. Lastly, it is argued that while partnerships within the OMNR are experiencing some difficulties, they constitute a genuine attempt to broaden the base of decision-making and to incorporate the concerns of stakeholders into resource management.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Throughout Canada's history there have been many movements to reform the public sector and each of these movements has helped to shape the way in which government functions today.¹ Current efforts at public sector reform have the potential for a staggering impact on both the administration of government and on the nature of government–stakeholder or, more narrowly, government–client relations. These efforts are a priority not only in Canada, but also in many other governments around the world. The similarities of these attempts at public sector management reform speak to the common pressures which governments now face.

In Canada, government partnerships are one approach to public sector reform. While they exist at all levels of government and in many shapes and sizes, the theme remains the same: elected representatives and public officials functioning in 'partnership' with the public.

The objectives of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources (OMNR), reflecting a mandate which deals with a public commodity, namely the distribution and protection of our public natural resources, are particularly conducive to government partnerships. This is evidenced by the identification of partnership as a major element of the OMNR's strategic direction for the

1990's and the existence of partnership arrangements as early as the 1940's. In addition, the OMNR has recently been awarded the 1992 Institute of Public Administration of Canada Award for Innovative Management on the theme of partnership management. While the Ministry has participated in partnership arrangements for decades, the renewed commitment to the approach is occurring at the same time as the Ministry and, indeed, the Ontario government as a whole, is attempting to establish a framework for service quality. This thesis will explore the nature of partnerships in the OMNR and their impact on government.

Chapter one begins by explaining the intent and methodology of this thesis. Following this, the reader will be provided with an outline of the thesis contents, proposed success factors which will guide the examination of specific cases, and six tentative hypotheses. Finally, this chapter will present a brief overview of public sector reform movements both in Canada and in other countries, as well as the general policy environment within which government partnership is being pursued in Canada.

PURPOSE OF THESIS

Rosabeth Moss Kanter states that the use of partnerships and joint ventures as a strategic imperative in today's corporations results from attempts to manage change and respond to the demands of a global economy. Kanter

compares this global economy to a corporate olympics in which companies must juggle the contradictory challenges of conserving resources while also pursuing innovation.²

In Canada, the competing challenges to which Kanter refers can be observed in both the public and private sectors. Increasing demands by the public for more consensual decision-making, greater levels of public participation, and a higher quality of public service, combined with economic pressures within the government itself, have resulted in a period of severe fiscal restraint. The need to produce 'more with less' is manifested in movements such as the Service-Quality movement and government initiatives such as Public Service 2000 (PS 2000) at the federal level and Best Value for Tax Dollars at the provincial level in Ontario.³

Partnership arrangements provide an opportunity for public sector managers to increase the quality of public service with fewer resources while at the same time answering the call for greater public involvement in decision-making. However, the road to successful partnership is not always smooth. As public officials disperse power and authority by allowing the public to assume decision-making responsibilities, they must also accommodate demands for democratic accountability, both to their political masters and to the public. Partnership agreements, by their very nature, are fraught with difficulties and accompanied by risks. Public officials must,

therefore, be cognizant of the limitations to partnership in the public sector and must pursue these agreements with care.

The potential implications of innovative management practices such as partnership should be of interest to political scientists, politicians and scholars. The suitability of the parliamentary traditions of ministerial responsibility and bureaucratic accountability in modern government are often debated. Scholars generally acknowledge that the process of governing is, at the very least, becoming increasingly complex. We must ask ourselves, therefore, how this new way of 'doing business' through innovative management practices like partnerships will affect both our parliamentary traditions and the bureaucracy which has developed to manage our resources.

This thesis will describe and analyse partnership agreements within the OMNR. The degree of commitment to the agreements will be assessed as will their impact on government–stakeholder relations and the traditions of ministerial responsibility and accountability. In particular, the extent to which power or authority is actually dispersed will be determined. In addition, the thesis will address assertions by some theorists that partnerships provide a mechanism for reducing public criticism of government policy. The environment in which partnerships have been established will be examined to determine if interest group activity and/or political pressure contributed to their development.

An assessment will also be made of the degree of success achieved in each of the partnerships studied. Finally, a number of factors which may be critical to the success of partnership arrangements will be examined and recommendations made regarding the best means of establishing and preserving successful partnerships.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The initial research task undertaken for this thesis was the collection and review of literature relating to public sector reform, service-quality and partnership. While ample scholarly material is available regarding the first two topics, literature specifically relating to partnership is more limited. An extensive review of articles in scholarly journals as well as government publications provided insight into the Canadian experience in these areas.

Following the literature review, a survey was distributed to each of the Districts within the OMNR to assess the types of partnership arrangements currently in existence. These data also proved useful in illustrating the degree to which OMNR staff understand the concept of partnership. The questionnaire for the District survey is contained in Appendix B of this thesis.

Results from the District survey and the 14 partnership cases submitted by the OMNR to the 1992 IPAC competition on Innovative Management provided the data from which six case studies were selected. Partnership

arrangements were selected on the basis of their representativeness of the various types of partnerships identified in scholarly writings as well as their representativeness within the OMNR. Criteria for category representation included the number of partners involved in the partnership, its longevity and the degree of formalization associated with the arrangement. At least one agreement was selected from each of the four regions in the OMNR so that differences in both geography and client type would be represented. Since it could not be expected that district staff would provide data on 'failed' attempts, it is assumed that each case submitted was considered by the OMNR to be successful.

Chapter two will provide a working definition and four categories of partnership. The OMNR partnerships examined in this thesis fall into three of these four categories. Since so-called "contributory partnerships" are not generally viewed as "true" partnerships, it was decided early on in the research that the questions being considering in this thesis did not apply to this type of arrangement.

Two case studies were selected to represent each of the three remaining partnership categories as follows:

<u>Location</u>	<u>Partnership</u>	<u>Type</u>
Algonquin Park	Algonquin Forestry Authority	Collaborative
Sault Ste. Marie	Tupper/Shields Comanagement Committee	Collaborative
Wawa	Magpie Forest Co-Management	Advisory

Welland	Welland River Remedial Action Plan	Advisory
Thunder Bay	Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility	Operational
Bowmanville	Goodyear Fishway	Operational

Once the case studies had been selected, interviews were conducted with individuals associated with each partnership. Government officials provided useful insights into the history of the partnership as well as the motivation for its creation. An extensive review of government documents and files, including formal reports, memoranda and legislative briefs provided additional background information relating to the environment within which the partnership was established.

Similarly, personal interviews were conducted with non-governmental partners. These individuals provided a unique perspective both on the motivation for each partnership's creation and on the degree of success which it has achieved.

Interviews were conducted in an open-ended format. Questionnaires utilized for the governmental and non-governmental partners (see Appendixes C and D) were slightly different, reflecting the differing perspectives which these groups have.

Analysis is both descriptive and comparative in nature. A description of each of the six cases provides general information regarding the partnership itself and the political and/or policy environment in which it was established.

A comparative analysis of the cases identifies factors which are present or absent in each case and provides a foundation for assessing success factors and political implications.

The OMNR presently participates in thousands of partnership agreements. For this reason, it is difficult to extrapolate from only six case studies principles which will apply to all partnerships. However, while the OMNR does not have an inventory of partnerships by type, many of its partnerships are generic agreements which have been centrally conceived as part of a particular program. As a result, while the partners may change, there is little variety to the format and structure of these partnerships. The non-generic partnership agreements represent unique responses to specific situations within the various districts of that ministry. Consideration will be given, therefore, to the presence of a particular type of partnership in the OMNR when assessing success factors and making recommendations.

CONTENT OF THESIS

Following this introductory chapter, the second chapter will provide an overview of partnership agreements, a working definition of partnership, and the categories used in this thesis. The concept of a partnership continuum, based on the degree to which power is shared, will be introduced. Chapter two will also outline the OMNR's approach to partnership, the history and

philosophy of these agreements within that ministry and the policy environment within which partnerships are being promoted.

Chapters three to five will provide descriptive data relating to the six case studies under examination. Each of the three chapters will deal with one partnership category. The criteria determining classification and the extent and nature of each type of partnership within the OMNR will be specifically outlined.

Each partnership will be examined to determine the social and political environment in which it was established and the key individuals involved. A thorough review of the objectives, structure and operation of each agreement will be provided as well as an account of any difficulties encountered along the way.

Chapter six will examine the political implications of partnership agreements. The first component of this chapter will provide theoretical and practical frameworks for evaluating the impact of these agreements on the doctrines of ministerial responsibility and accountability. The extent to which real power-sharing has occurred as a result of these agreements will be determined. In addition, the impact which these partnerships have had on the government-stakeholder relationship will be examined. Chapter seven will provide criteria for, and an assessment of, the success of these partnerships. Four success factors will be examined to determine their impact

on the outcome of the partnership, and limitations to partnership success will be discussed.

The final chapter will summarize the data and arguments presented in the thesis and will relate them to the following hypotheses:

1. While partnership agreements blur the practice of accountability, they do not alter the formal accountability relationships in government today.
2. Partnerships *can* make criticism of government policy difficult by making government critics a 'part of the process'.
3. Public sector partnerships which result in real power-sharing are infrequent and usually developed in an environment subject to political pressure and/or intensive interest group activity.
4. Partnership agreements *can* work if they are developed with care and commitment.
5. Partnerships which have been developed with a fairly equitable balance of power and/or a high level of commitment by all the partners are more likely to succeed.
6. Partnerships with fairly narrow objectives and which have been formalized in some way are more likely to succeed.

The last component of chapter eight will provide recommendations for governments considering establishing a partnership agreement.

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM

The globalization phenomenon, which currently affects the economies of many countries, also applies to approaches to reform in public sector

management. During the 1980's, for example, many governments introduced practices such as downsizing, contracting out and privatization, as well as exploring various new management philosophies such as Total Quality Management (TQM).⁴ Efforts to apply a private sector approach to public management also crossed national boundaries. In Australia, Neville Wran, the former Premier of New South Wales, attempted to impose the same financial discipline and performance criteria present in the private sector on government departments. Similarly, in Great Britain the Financial Management Initiative, and in Canada, PS 2000, both attempt to make government 'leaner and meaner' by utilizing some of the values traditionally found in private business.⁵

The explanation for this globalization of reform rests on the presence of common factors such as the advanced means of communication between governments, the difficulties associated with cutting programs during periods of fiscal restraint, and pressures by the business communities in various countries to modernize government operations.⁶ The result has been different reform movements based on common principles such as empowerment and improving the quality of service to the public.

Within Canada specifically, efforts at reform have reflected changing public perspectives and concerns. During the 1970's, an increasing number of rules and regulations were developed to monitor government operations,

thereby slowing down government processes. These changes reflected the public's concerns that government information be accessible, that employment equity be pursued and that government decision-making be 'opened up'.⁷

During the 1980's, however, as both the public and public servants became frustrated by government processes, efforts at reform targeted four critical areas of concern. The two most important were demands for better service to the public and increased participation in decision-making. In addition, pressures associated with adjusting to new technologies and program limitations resulting from budgetary restrictions necessitated innovative structural changes within government.⁸

By the end of the 1980's, the federal government had instituted a massive initiative to revitalize the federal public service. PS 2000 was announced by then Prime Minister Mulroney on December 12, 1989, on the premise that the public sector must be fundamentally changed to "prepare it to deal effectively with the challenges of the early years of the 21st century."⁹ The overall initiative was led by the Clerk of the Privy Council, and each of ten task forces was led by a deputy minister. The task forces were established to investigate areas of concern such as staffing and program delivery and to develop strategies for implementing change within the public sector. While a determination of the success of PS 2000 in achieving its ambitious goals is premature, its existence speaks to the urgent nature of the challenges that

governments across the country currently face.

In an attempt to explore different organizational forms which might satisfy or relieve these challenges, PS 2000 and Consulting and Audit Canada sponsored a Round Table on Alternative Organizational Forms in January, 1992. While there were many different opinions and approaches to public sector reform in Canada, it was generally agreed that traditional hierarchical bureaucracies could no longer satisfy the need for a responsive and effective public service in a complex and constantly changing environment. Participants also agreed that no universal solution could be applied to all government organizations due to the diversity of their mandates and that all organizational change should promote a more effective, efficient and responsive public service.¹⁰

Evidence of the extent of attempts at public sector reform can be gathered from government submissions to the Institute of Public Administration of Canada's competition for the Innovative Management Award in both 1990 and 1991. This award is similar to the Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award given by the U.S. government.¹¹ The first-ever competition in Canada was held in 1990, and while the contest organizers expected to receive only 15 to 20 submissions, they received 57 entries from across the country.¹² By 1993 the number of entries to the competition had increased to more than 120 submissions.

Entries elaborated on various types of public service innovation, ranging from 'turn arounds', a process of change which affects all aspects of an organization in trouble, to job sharing and the utilization of new technology. Partnerships with the private sector, other governments and departments within the same government, made a strong appearance in this competition, representing 21 of the 57 entries.¹³ The following year, partnership management was the theme of the IPAC competition, and 103 government agencies submitted profiles of their most successful partnership arrangements.

The federal government's PS 2000 initiative has been mirrored by a variety of provincial initiatives. For example, the government of British Columbia launched Service Quality B.C. in September, 1990. This program promotes customer service and quality management within the British Columbia public service.¹⁴ Ten steps to delivering excellence in quality and service were identified and ministries were encouraged to build on success stories within their ministry, which they called 'islands of excellence'.¹⁵

Similarly, the Ontario government released Best Value for Tax Dollars in February, 1992. This document explores the pursuit of improved service quality by identifying service quality 'gaps' within the Ontario public service and outlining strategies to close these gaps. Paramount to this examination is the ability of the government to provide better service with fewer resources.

Research for the Ontario Customer Service Task Force indicated that

while the public ranked the service of the Ontario Government higher than that of the federal government, it was also ranked lower than Canada Post, municipal governments and various private sector organizations. In addition, only 23 percent of the public felt that service is improving.¹⁶ Researchers identified a number of barriers to providing good service, such as lack of staff and prolonged approval processes, which have resulted in discrepancies, or 'gaps', between customer expectations and satisfaction with public sector performance. The task force made a number of recommendations to close these 'gaps' which included the establishment of partnerships to improve service, reduce waste, and deploy resources in a manner which will reap the greatest results.¹⁷

A commitment to management strategies such as partnerships reflects the government's perception that the public is not satisfied with government services as well as the political, social and economic environment within which government must function. A statement by Brian Burke, Premier of Western Australia, applies equally well to Canada;

"Government must now respond to a public which, although it demands new services, has made it clear that it will not accept tax increases."¹⁸

The major questions examined in this thesis are: Do partnerships work? and What price must our system of government pay for their success?

ENDNOTES

1. Many of the early reforms focused on issues relating to political patronage. The Civil Service Act was passed in 1882 in response to recommendations by a Royal Commission established to review issues of patronage and the promotion of career civil servants. A strengthened Civil Service Act was passed in 1908 establishing a Civil Service Commission whose mandate was to ensure the implementation of the merit principle, thereby limiting the autonomy of departments in personnel matters. In 1918, nearly the entire civil service was placed under the Civil Service Commission. Detailed information regarding these reforms and more recent attempts to reform government is provided in a variety of scholarly writings and texts.
2. Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, When Giants Learn To Dance, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), pp.18-30.
3. Government of Ontario, Best Value For Tax Dollars, (Queen's Printer, 1992). Information regarding Public Service 2000 is provided in a variety of task force reports including Public Service 2000, Managing Change in the Public Service – A Guide for the Perplexed, (Department of Supply and Services Canada, 1991).
4. Savoie, Donald J., "Public service reforms: looking to history and to other countries", Optimum, Vol.23-1 (1992-93), p.8.
5. Denhardt, Robert B., The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations", (California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), pp.9-10.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid, p.8.
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10. Edwards and Mulder, Op.Cit., pp.3-5.
11. Borins, Sandford, "Public management innovation in Canada: evidence from the IPAC competition", Optimum, Vol.22-3 (1991-92), p.5.

12. Ibid, p.5.
13. Ibid, pp.11–14.
14. Barton, Joan A. and D.Brian Marson, Service Quality: An Introduction, (Province of British Columbia, 1991), p.2.
15. Ibid, pp.4–45.
16. Government of Ontario, Best Value for Tax Dollars, p.73.
17. Ibid, pp.14–41.
18. Barton, Op. Cit., p.3.

Chapter Two

PUBLIC PARTNERSHIP IN ONTARIO: AN OVERVIEW

Within the private sector, the practice of joining forces with other organizations in partnership arrangements is not new. Often referred to as strategic alliances or joint ventures, these arrangements are considered to enhance the competitive strength of an organization. While their proliferation within the public sector is more limited, the concept and use of public partnership have grown steadily in recent years.

The first component of this chapter will explain the concept of partnership and provide working definitions for use in this thesis. An overview of the various types of partnership will provide a foundation for further analysis of specific partnership agreements. The concept of a partnership continuum will be introduced and the difficulties associated with attempts to categorize specific agreements will be discussed.

The second component of chapter two will deal specifically with the approach to partnership taken by the OMNR. The policy environment within which partnerships exist in that Ministry will be outlined. Lastly, this chapter will provide a brief summary of the overall status of partnership agreements within the OMNR by examining the results of the District survey as outlined in chapter one.

PARTNERSHIP: CONCEPT AND DEFINITION

'Partnership', 'empowerment', 'service'; these words can be used to describe innovations in government and public sector management in the 1990's. 'Partnership', specifically, has become one of the buzzwords of the decade, appearing in a range of government documents, including budget speeches and strategic policy documents. For example, the Science Council of Canada has asserted that only partnership with business, labour and educational and research institutions combined with a decentralization of decision-making will ensure Canada's scientific and technological success.¹ Similarly, the PS 2000 Task Force on Workforce Adaptiveness recognized that partnerships and coalitions are necessary to explore differing perspectives and use scarce resources effectively.² Within Ontario, Premier Bob Rae stressed these new associations when he pledged to "govern with a sense of partnership, a partnership that includes those who were neglected or left out in the past."³

Despite the common usage of the term 'partnership', it often appears that there is not a common understanding of what the term implies. 'Partnership' has been used to describe new and innovative arrangements which significantly alter the power structures within government, as well as pre-existing and very limited arrangements such as the contracting out of government operations.

In the strictest sense, 'partnership' implies a sharing of power and the existence of collaborative action. However, the extent to which power is actually shared varies greatly from one partnership to another. The presence of an ongoing commitment, and shared contributions, needs and benefits, differentiates 'partnerships' from other more temporary arrangements.⁴ For the purpose of this thesis, partnership will be defined as "a relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and/or mutual benefits."⁵ It has been suggested that true partnerships are based on relatively equitable power relationships between the partners. At the very least, there must be a willingness to acknowledge the contribution of each partner and the validity of their interests.

The concept of power is fundamental to partnerships. True partnerships promote empowerment by sharing decision-making power in either the planning or implementation stage of an agreement. However, merely devolving some authority does not ensure a partnership's success. If management's attitude is that this power is a 'gift' which may be given and taken away at its discretion, the foundation for the agreement will be eroded.⁶ Partnerships must, therefore, be based on a genuine commitment to involve others in the decision-making process.

Government partnerships serve a variety of purposes, often depending on who is participating in the arrangement. For example, partnerships with organizations which serve a public purpose, such as non-profit organizations, usually focus on increasing government responsiveness in policy development or program delivery. Alternatively, partnerships with private sector organizations often promote more efficient program delivery or encourage technological innovation and sometimes require control measures such as formal contracts to accommodate differing goals among the partners.⁷

Within the private sector, large corporations have increasingly relied on partnerships for more than a decade. Companies such as Kodak and Apple, in pursuit of management strategies which focus on 'doing more with less', have developed alliances with suppliers, customers and venture partners.⁸ Partnerships involving the public sector, however, have been more limited. Governments have often confused 'partnership' with 'consultation'— soliciting public input only to proceed along pre-determined paths. In a recent presentation to public servants, a Deputy Minister of the Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services stated that government commitments to partnership agreements have often been cosmetic or chimerical responses to "polls and news reports about unresponsive government".⁹ Despite such opinions, partnerships have become a strategic approach to developing, delivering and managing public programs.

Within the Ontario government, partnership development has taken a particularly high-profile position as a major component of the Premier's Councils' mandate. This mandate is intended to ensure that long-term planning and policy development become more democratic by fostering expanded public participation.¹⁰ Also within Ontario, an inter-ministerial partnership network has been established to assist ministries in implementing 'partnership' by providing a forum for exploring policy development and service development initiatives based on the principles of partnership and cooperation.¹¹ At the present time, this network consists of 40 members from 25 different ministries and central agencies.

The Ontario Ministry of Education and Training recently published a package of partnership profiles with business, unions, community organizations and other educational institutions. This collection of thirty-nine profiles is intended as evidence that Ontario's colleges and universities are working on a collaborative basis with other organizations to resolve problems and meet the demand for knowledge and skills required in today's economy.¹² This ministry has also established a Partnership Development Branch whose mandate is to pursue these agreements proactively.

Despite the increasing emphasis on partnerships as a strategic or policy tool, they cannot be considered a panacea for organizations striving for innovation. Independent studies of partnership agreements within the private

sector indicate that approximately 70 percent of joint ventures are disbanded or do not meet partner expectations.¹³ Partnerships remain very fragile entities whose establishment and maintenance require great care and planning.

The motivations for entering into partnerships are as varied as the partnerships themselves. Within the private sector, the primary justifications for cooperative alliances include limited resources, flexible access to other resources or markets, and economies of scale.¹⁴ Similarly, the motivations for establishing partnership agreements within the public sector include those based on resources such as achieving 'more with less', accessing outside infrastructures to enhance program delivery, and providing better leverage for tax dollars.¹⁵

Public sector partnerships are also viewed as a means of providing better service to the public. Studies completed in 1990 indicated that less than one-half of Canadians surveyed felt the federal government was as committed as the private sector to providing good quality service. While provincial and municipal governments were rated slightly higher than the federal government, the general level of satisfaction with government performance was low.¹⁶ Partnerships allow the government to provide goods and services in a more responsive, efficient and effective manner.

Partnerships between the government and other organizations can also reflect an ideological position that supports increased public participation in

decision-making. In a world in which governments are constantly attempting to resolve complex issues such as poverty, dwindling resources and environmental destruction, unilateral decision-making has become not only unpalatable to many citizens, but also impractical. Partnerships recognize the need to increase consultation and public participation by facilitating coalitions representing the various issues and interests which exist.¹⁷

Regardless of the motivation, the increased application of partnership in government appears inevitable. Not only has the private sector recognized the potential benefits of these alliances, but the public sector acknowledges their value as well. In addition, the public is demanding a greater level of involvement in areas which have previously been the domain of either politicians or public servants.

Partnerships have been defined in a number of ways. For example, Kanter has divided private sector partnerships into three categories which include multi-organizational service alliances, opportunistic alliances and stakeholder alliances. These categories are based primarily on the composition of the alliance membership as well as the purpose of the alliance itself.¹⁸ Other analysts use criteria such as a combination of membership composition and operation of the agreement to define partnership categories.¹⁹

Regardless of the criteria used to categorize partnerships, scholars generally agree that 'true' partnerships promote empowerment by sharing decision-making power. For the purpose of this thesis, therefore, category definitions will be based on the partnership purpose and the nature and extent to which power is exercised by the partners. Power is a relational concept which can be used to describe a variety of relationships including those which exist between partners. Power is defined here as "the capacity of an individual, or group of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner in which he desires, and to prevent his own being modified in a manner which he does not."²⁰ This power may be manifested in the ability to control or direct others, or the ability to influence others informally by such means as suggestion, persuasion, or intimidation. Control is exercised by virtue of formal authority, while influence may result from the authority of expertise or the ability to reward or punish others in some way.²¹

Power, in the sense of influence, is of particular importance when examining partnerships as these arrangements often consist of partners from a variety of different organizations who may not possess any direct, hierarchical control over each other. In order that non-governmental partners may be empowered, therefore, they must be able to influence the decisions and actions of government. Four categories of partnerships which utilize this concept of power have been developed and while they cannot provide

watertight compartments into which all partnerships will fall, they do provide a useful tool for evaluating and comparing general partnership types.

Collaborative partnerships may be defined as partnerships in which each partner exercises real power, in the sense of either control or influence, in the decision-making process. This type of agreement best represents 'true' or ideal partnerships. Decisions are, whenever possible, made by building a consensus and partners are, to various extents, mutually dependent. Because of the collaborative nature of these partnerships there is usually a pooling of resources such as money, information and labour. Typically, the government or public organization surrenders some power to the other partners, either by refraining from exercising direct control or by delegating formal authority to one or more partners.²² Co-management boards are one example of this type of agreement.²³

While collaborative partnerships are 'true' partnerships in terms of power sharing, their presence within the public sector appears to be limited. This may be a result of the inherent conflicts between partnership and some of the values which guide public sector management in Canada. The challenge to government is to maintain values such as consistency, fairness, prudence, probity and ministerial responsibility while pursuing innovative management approaches.²⁴ Partnerships offer the flexibility that is sometimes needed to deal with complex issues and to respond to client needs, but the scope of

innovation may be limited by the very nature of public business. Collaborative partnerships in which power is actually shared or delegated may directly affect the maintenance of these values and traditions. It is possible, however, that the number of truly collaborative government partnerships within Canada may increase as the public continues to demand greater involvement in decision-making.

Unlike collaborative partnerships, *consultative* partnerships do not involve a direct sharing of decision-making power. Rather, these partnerships provide a forum for soliciting advice from individuals, groups and organizations outside of government. Control is retained by the government; however, the partners exercise influence on government decisions. The degree of influence depends on factors such as the degree of formalization associated with the arrangement, the extent of public interest in the issue, the credibility of the partners and whether the results of the partnership are made public.²⁵

Consultative partnerships often take the form of advisory councils. While some theorists feel these consultative arrangements do not represent real partnerships at all, due to the advisory nature of the arrangements, they often evolve to become more collaborative with responsibility for specific policy areas being delegated to members of the partnership.²⁶

Operational partnerships are those partnerships in which work of a physical or non-physical nature is shared to achieve common or compatible

goals. This type of partnership sometimes involves the sharing of resources, such as funding, to achieve these goals.²⁷ Power is usually retained by the government or public organization but the partners can often exercise a degree of influence by virtue of their operational involvement. This type of partnership is common within the public sector and often focuses on improving the efficiency or responsiveness of program delivery.

In *contributory* partnerships, a public or private organization agrees to provide sponsorship or material support for an activity in which it will have no operational involvement.²⁸ These partnerships do not include any ongoing involvement by the non-governmental partners in either decision-making or operation and are, therefore, unlikely to disperse or alter the power-sharing relationship in any way. Partnerships have been defined in a variety of ways; however, most scholars agree that 'true' partnerships promote empowerment by sharing decision-making power. For this reason, it was decided early on in the research for this thesis that the questions being considered did not apply to this type of arrangement.

In light of the complex and diverse nature of government activities and of stakeholder involvement in these activities, it is apparent that attempts to apply 'quick fixes' or generic solutions to public sector problems will not be successful. Rather, public servants must develop 'tailor-made' solutions that address the unique circumstances which they face.²⁹ As a result, the extent,

nature and type of partnerships which are developed within the public sector vary greatly. It is inherently difficult, therefore, to classify partnership agreements against preexisting criteria. Partnerships may not only satisfy the criteria for more than one category, but they may also evolve from one category to another as the partnership progresses.

The concept of a partnership continuum may be a useful tool when considering partnership agreements. Since 'power' is fundamental to the nature of these agreements, a partnership continuum based on the degree of power exercised by non-governmental partners, or retained by government, may alleviate problems associated with overlapping categories. Contributory partnerships, or agreements in which no power is shared, would appear at one end of the continuum while truly collaborative partnerships would appear at the other end of the continuum. Partnerships in which there is an operational or an advisory function, or both, would appear on the continuum based solely on the extent and nature of power-sharing associated with that particular agreement.

A partnership continuum illustrates that while one type of partnership may generally result in greater levels of power-sharing than another, this will not always be the case. For example, certain types of operational agreements may result in far greater power being exercised by non-governmental partners than typical consultative partnerships. While partnerships can be evaluated on a

sliding scale in theory, for practical purposes it is necessary to classify partnerships into groups so that comparisons and generalizations may be made.

PARTNERSHIP AND THE OMNR

"MNR will not only support and facilitate partnerships, but will actively seek them out. The ministry will look for greater involvement from other public agencies, citizens' organizations, aboriginal peoples, businesses, labour unions and individuals who may wish to assist the ministry with program delivery or become directly involved in resource planning and management.

The concept of partnership advanced here, however, goes beyond work-sharing to one of shared decision-making in resource policy and planning."³⁰

The preceding quotation was taken from the OMNR policy and strategy document for the 1990's. Within this document the OMNR outlines its new policy of 'sustainable development' as well as supporting strategies for the achievement of this policy. Partnership in resource management is one of three supporting strategies which this Ministry intends to utilize to ensure that the public shares in both the benefits and responsibilities of resource stewardship.

Partnership is not new to the OMNR. As early as the 1940's, this ministry was establishing partnership agreements with outside agencies. Often called working relationships, these agreements were born of necessity. The very

nature of OMNR business and the geographic dispersion of its offices often necessitated innovative management tools such as partnership. For example, an OMNR partnership with municipalities in the early 1950's resulted in the creation of conservation authorities and this has been, by far, the most collaborative partnership into which this Ministry has entered. These conservation authorities have formal responsibility for floodplain and watershed management, including decision-making authority for planning, program direction and operations.³¹

The current thrust towards partnership within the OMNR is viewed as a way of managing public money and public resources while attempting to achieve full consultation with and the consensus of the public. According to the current Assistant Deputy Minister of Operations, the major objectives of partnerships in this ministry include allowing greater public participation in decision-making and changing the orientation of resource management from a 'big brother' approach to one which encourages public involvement, thereby becoming more acceptable to clients.³²

To this end, the OMNR established a Partnership Task Force in 1990. The mandate of this task force was to develop a policy framework within which partnerships would be established and to identify corporate issues which may arise as a result. The final report of the task force which was presented to the Ministry's Executive Committee in April, 1992, includes a partnership

policy framework, several individual policies, an update of corporate issues, and an implementation strategy.

While the task force report acknowledges that the ultimate question relating to partnership development is "How far should power-sharing go?", it states that resolution of this issue can only be achieved once other major policy initiatives such as native self-government progress further. It is hoped that these initiatives will provide the foundation and the experience for establishing an 'ends policy' for partnership development.

The OMNR defines partnerships as any "relationship involving **sharing** with people and organizations for the achievement of **mutual** and/or **compatible** objectives" and specifies that benefits and costs as well as the associated risks and accountability must be shared.³³ The task force identified a number of principles which were intended to ensure that the OMNR's integrity and position within a partnership would not be jeopardized. Such principles as compatibility with OMNR interests, mutual benefits/risks, equality of access to the partnership by all members of the public, and control, by way of accountability mechanisms, assist the public servant when establishing or participating in a partnership agreement. In addition, a checklist of questions dealing with a variety of partnership issues such as financial arrangements and administration was developed.

Although the task force recommended the development and implementation of education and training programs in partnership management as well as the establishment of a partnership communications strategy, neither of these has been initiated. Ministry staff state that these initiatives have been postponed pending the integration of the task force with a Service–Quality Committee which was established in 1991. This integration will reflect the use of partnerships as one mechanism for addressing the management of relationships when service–quality initiatives are pursued. It is hoped that partnership policy will eventually fit into the service–quality framework currently being developed by the Service–Quality Committee.³⁴

In 1992 the OMNR won the Institute of Public Administration of Canada Award for Innovative Management, competing against 102 other entries. The submission included fourteen high–profile partnerships from the various districts within Ontario. Despite the fact that the Ministry's strategy statement advances the concept of shared decision–making in partnerships, no collaborative partnership was submitted to the IPAC competition. Ministry staff explain that there are very few of this type of partnership from which to draw a submission.³⁵

It is estimated by this author that there are presently close to one thousand partnership agreements between the OMNR and individuals or organizations outside the government. Many of these partnerships are simple agreements

between the Ministry and a single landowner for the purpose of completing some operation on private property. While there is no comprehensive inventory of these agreements, various OMNR staff have attempted to collect data on partnerships within their jurisdiction. In addition, many of the OMNR's partnerships are centrally conceived programs, such as the Community Fisheries Involvement Program (CFIP), which are implemented at the District level but coordinated at main office. CFIP is a management program which involves the joint action of the OMNR and members of the public in tackling assorted fisheries and habitat projects. Established in 1982, the program has grown steadily and in 1990 approximately 250 CFIP projects were approved across the province.³⁶

Without an inventory it is impossible to determine accurately the proportion of OMNR partnerships falling into each category. Ministry staff estimate, however, that consultative and operational partnerships each account for 45 percent of the Ministry's partnership agreements while collaborative and contributory partnerships each account for only five percent.

The lack of educational and training programs on partnership management was evident in the results of the District survey. More than 25 percent of the partnerships submitted were improperly classified by Ministry staff. Moreover, a number of Districts considered employment agreements, such as contracting out, to be operational partnerships. Employment agreements were

eliminated from the survey data and the remaining submissions were reclassified where necessary.

OMNR staff appeared to have a sound understanding of the difference between consultative and operational partnerships; however, they were unclear regarding what constituted true power-sharing. In addition, there were a number of problems associated with the definition for contributory partnerships which was used in the survey. The contribution of labour resources in a partnership seemed to suggest some operational involvement on the part of the partners. As a result, the definition was modified to reflect contributions of a financial or material nature only.

Of the 33 Districts and lakes surveyed, 30 responses were received, resulting in a response rate of approximately 91 percent.(Appendix E) Only 42 percent of the submissions included examples of all three partnership types being considered in this thesis. This cannot be construed, however, to represent the lack of a particular type of partnership within a District as it may reflect a lack of understanding of the various categories and criteria.

Approximately 60 percent of the collaborative partnerships submitted by the Districts were established between the OMNR and no more than three partners. Forest Management Agreements (FMA) between the OMNR and forestry companies and agreements with native groups accounted for almost one-third of this type of partnership. The majority of the remainder were

agreements in which the objectives were focused on a specific management area.

All the consultative partnerships submitted, on the other hand, consisted of more than four partners. The format of these partnerships was usually an advisory or citizens committee. Objectives were broad in nature and the jurisdiction of the partnership was often a large management area such as an entire District.

Operational partnerships were almost evenly divided among groups consisting of more than four partners and those comprised of fewer than four partners. International agreements made an appearance within this category, usually focusing on U.S.–Canada joint habitat rehabilitation ventures. All of the operational agreements had fairly specific objectives which provided for measurable results. Many Districts confused arrangements in which an OMNR operation was contracted out with truly operational partnerships in which an ongoing relationship between the partners existed and both the risks and benefits were shared.

Only 32 percent of the Districts surveyed submitted examples of contributory partnerships. This was due, in part, to the confusion associated with the category definition. As a result, changes were made to the criteria associated with the definition itself. In addition, the concept of 'sponsorship' is fairly new within this Ministry and few of these agreements exist. Of the

agreements submitted, almost 75 percent consisted of fewer than four partners and most had very narrow objectives, allowing for the completion of a specific program of operation.

While partnership agreements within other government organizations may be different in both orientation and scope than those within the OMNR, it is likely that some of the tendencies indicated within this Ministry can be observed elsewhere. In light of the nature of public sector business and the constraints which may limit management techniques within this sector, it is probable that truly collaborative partnerships are no more common within other government organizations than they are within the OMNR. The *concept* of sharing power with the public may not be new to Canadian government; however, practical attempts to do so by utilizing collaborative agreements are fairly recent. Moreover, the potential implications of such power-sharing are sufficient to discourage or restrict the degree to which governments embrace the practice.

To the extent that collaborative partnerships do exist within the public sector, it is reasonable to expect that for logistical purposes these agreements exist between small numbers of partners and that their objectives, at least initially, are specific in nature. Similarly, the technical nature of operational agreements seems to suggest that these partnerships exhibit a narrow focus oriented towards a specific program or operation. Lastly, the fact that most

consultative partnerships take the form of advisory or citizens' committees implies a larger number of partners and a broader scope of operation. It is also likely that those partnerships which do attempt to alter the power relationship between government and the public will be more formalized than those based on a more traditional structure.

The partnership agreements submitted by the OMNR were varied in nature and scope. Despite this variety, they illustrated a number of trends in partnership development and displayed a commitment within that Ministry to move from a paternalistic approach to governing to one in which government functions in partnership with the public. What has yet to be determined is the extent to which partnerships established by the OMNR have been successful in making this change. The next three chapters of this thesis will examine six specific partnership agreements within the OMNR and will provide a foundation for answering this question.

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23. At the federal level, the transfer of the management, operations, and legal control of Canadian airports from the federal government to Local Airport Authorities provides a good example of a collaborative partnership.

24. Armstrong, Op.Cit., pp.18–25.

25. Kernaghan, Op.Cit., pp.10–11.

26. The Canadian Labour Force Development Board, for example, is primarily a consultative partnership. However, the federal government is committed to implementing the board's recommendations if they have been made by consensus of the group.

27. Kernaghan, Op.Cit., pp.8–9.

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Chapter Three

COLLABORATIVE PARTNERSHIPS

Collaborative partnerships, that is, partnerships in which power-sharing exists, best satisfy the criteria for 'real' partnership. These partnerships are characterized by consensual decision-making by participants who are mutually dependent to some degree. A typical collaborative arrangement requires that each partner relinquish some autonomy. Usually, the public organization either refrains from exercising control of the other partners or actually delegates this control.¹ Regardless of the approach taken, the partnership must be established with a genuine intent to power share.

Within the OMNR, very few truly collaborative partnerships exist despite the Ministry's claim that it advances partnerships in which decision-making in resource policy and planning is shared.² While OMNR staff estimate that approximately five percent of their partnership agreements are collaborative, on examination of those agreements submitted in response to the district survey, many of the 'collaborative' partnerships were found to be consultative in nature with no direct sharing of power involved. Inaccurate assessments of the proportion of each type of partnership may be the result of a lack of understanding by OMNR staff regarding what constitutes real power sharing or of differing opinions on the extent to which partners can influence

decision-making.

This chapter will provide descriptive analysis of the establishment, structure and operation of the Algonquin Forestry Authority in Algonquin Park, and the Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario. The Algonquin Forestry Authority provides an example of a truly collaborative partnership while the Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee illustrates a partnership which, despite its stated intention of functioning as a **full partner**, has not met the criteria associated with collaborative partnerships. Its inclusion in this chapter is based on the premise that it is representative of the types of partnership arrangements which are often considered by government, albeit erroneously, to be collaborative in nature. While the political implications, success factors and limitations of these partnerships will be discussed further in chapters 6 and 7, this chapter will discuss the appropriateness of category definitions as well as present general observations regarding the government's approach to these arrangements.

THE ALGONQUIN FORESTRY AUTHORITY

The Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) is no ordinary partnership. Established in 1975 to oversee logging and conduct forest harvesting within the boundaries of Algonquin Park, it functions as a Crown Agency. The

partnership is unique in that, while the government has formally delegated some of its powers to the authority, it has chosen to do so within the confines of the Crown Agency Act, thereby maintaining an arm's length relationship with the newly created body.

History

Approximately 65 million people live within a one-day drive of Algonquin Park. Established in 1893 under the Algonquin National Park Act, the Park was intended to preserve the headwaters of key watersheds in the province, to conserve the native forest, fish and wildlife, and to provide an area for both forestry and recreation.³ Classified as a Natural Environment Park under the Provincial Parks Classification System, Algonquin Park is one of only two natural environment parks in Ontario to be zoned for both recreation and utilization.⁴

The provision of the Park for multi-use in the Algonquin National Park Act was the foundation for years of conflict between the various user groups. Forest operations were conducted within the Park boundaries as early as the 1830's, prior to the recognition of logging as a valid and continuing function of the Park in 1893.⁵ The identification of recreation as a primary purpose of the park, however, reflected the foresight of the Royal Commission on Forest Reservation and National Parks in 1892. The Commission recommended that a portion of ungranted crown land be set apart for park use

as well as a forest reservation.⁶

The Park, located 120 miles north of Lake Ontario, covers a geographic area of approximately 2,900 square miles. Approximately twenty percent of Canada's export dollars are earned by the forest industry, and almost one-third of that is earned in Ontario. Algonquin Park provides the majority of the wood from central Ontario.⁷ Clearly, the forest industry within the Park makes a substantial contribution to both the local and provincial economies. Statistics indicating the extent of this contribution, however, have varied over the years. The most recent statistics available indicate that the direct contribution of both Algonquin Park logging and related primary manufacturing to the provincial economy was \$69.5 million in 1987 dollars.⁸

Algonquin Park is also significant in that it was the first provincial park established in Ontario and, as such, often provides a model for park management and policy development within the province. In addition, its proximity to Toronto enables large numbers of people (700,000 annually in 1972) to utilize the Park for recreational purposes. As a result, conflicts between advocates of forest harvesting within the Park and conservationists have been continuous.

These conflicts escalated during the late 1960's as ecologists and environmentalists noted the impact of logging operations on parks such as Lake Superior Provincial Park and Quetico Provincial Park in Ontario.

Delegations from the Algonquin Wildlands League, an environmental lobby group based in Toronto, toured such parks and released news bulletins in a variety of major papers across the province regarding the declining state of the province's park lands.

In December, 1969, CBC Television Network aired a special edition of the television series "The Land of Ours". The edition, entitled "No Man's Land", dealt with the forces and pressures which can destroy a park. Algonquin Provincial Park provided an illustration of what can result from a 'multi-use' designation. The two main threats to the park were alleged to be forest harvesting and over-use by recreationists.⁹

As public attention focused on Algonquin Park, the intensity of the debate regarding the future of logging within the park increased. Rene Brunelle, then Minister of Lands and Forests, was accused of gross mismanagement of the park by members of the Algonquin Wildlands League.¹⁰ At the same time, government supporters stated publicly that any proposal to impose stricter regulations on timber harvesting within the park would result in the most significant economic setback in the area's history.¹¹

Logging operations within the park were fraught with utilization and distribution problems. Eighteen different companies possessed timber licences which provided them with exclusive logging rights to various portions of park land. Each company conducted its own planning regarding

roads and areas for harvest, and each utilized only those products in which their company specialized. While the Ministry maintained approval authority for these licences, its administrative boundaries were such that a number of different administrative units approved the various plans.¹²

In an attempt to address the issue of long-term planning within the park, a draft Algonquin Park Master Plan was completed in 1968 by ministry staff under the leadership of the park superintendent. Public input was solicited during public hearings and open houses held in the park area and in Toronto. The plan proposed the designation of a small "primitive" area within the park which would be protected from all forest harvesting and the imposition of tough restrictions on logging companies.¹³

Following the release of the draft master plan, the Algonquin Park Advisory Committee was established in 1969 to advise the government on policy recommendations and alternatives presented in the proposed plan. It was hoped that this advice would lead to the completion of a final master plan for the park by 1975. A task force was also established to conduct economic impact studies relating to the recommendations and approximately 40 background papers were presented to the advisory committee. Between 1970 and 1972 the advisory committee submitted to the Minister 36 recommendations which formed the basis of the Master Plan completed in 1975. These recommendations supported the multi-use designation of the

park and reinforced the significance of the park to both the economic base and the recreational needs of the local area and the province.¹⁴

The composition of the advisory committee was broadly based, incorporating such representatives as the Algonquin Wildlands League, camping and conservation associations and local and provincial politicians. The Wildlands League, by far the most vocal group opposing logging within the park, resigned from the committee in 1970 citing as the reason frustration with a government and a process which was clearly oriented towards timber management.¹⁵

While the advisory committee completed its work, lobbying for and against forest harvesting in the park continued. Former premier of Ontario, Leslie Frost, sat as chairperson of the committee and during discussions with the press stated that the committee must strike a balance between the interests of lumbermen, recreationists and conservationists.¹⁶ Meanwhile, members of the Algonquin Wildlands League pointed out that Mr. Frost was also a director of Eddy Forest Products Ltd., implying that this position must influence his ability to view the issue of land use objectively.¹⁷

In October, 1971, a delegation of senior forest industry officials made a presentation to the then Premier of Ontario, William Davis, and to Rene Brunelle. During this presentation, the Premier was warned that unless government restrictions on timber harvest operations within the park were

eased, between 3,000 and 4,000 people in the province could lose their jobs. According to the president of the Ontario Forest Industries Association, the forest industry was encountering serious problems due to U.S. import duties and increasing restrictions on its operations.¹⁸

In 1972 the advisory committee was reestablished with expanded terms of reference allowing it to review management and ecological problems within the park in greater detail. Leslie Frost was again appointed chairperson for the committee and all members except one remained the same. At approximately the same time, researchers associated with the Faculty of Forestry at the University of Toronto released the results of a forest industry attitudes survey in which operators within the park were surveyed. Based on industry responses, the researchers determined that most officials within the industry felt that ongoing communication with government and participation in government policy formulation enabled them to substantially influence government policy.¹⁹

Partnership Creation

In July, 1973, then Natural Resources Minister, Leo Bernier, announced the Ministry's intention to create the Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) in accordance with recommendations made by the Algonquin Park Advisory Committee. The AFA was to be established by an act of the Legislature as a crown corporation responsible for undertaking land management and forest

harvesting in the park. The new Authority would replace the operations being carried out by eighteen separate operators.²⁰

In October, 1974, Bernier tabled in the Legislature the Algonquin Park Master Plan. Shortly thereafter, the Ontario Legislature debated government Bill 155, "An Act to Incorporate the Algonquin Forestry Authority". During the debate, the NDP opposition argued that industry could get all the wood it needed from sources outside the park. The Liberal opposition criticized the government's forest management claiming that better management would have allowed a decrease in logging within the park. Despite opposition, the Progressive Conservative majority passed the bill by a 36 to 22 vote on December 10, 1974.²¹ The government also established an Ontario Provincial Parks Council whose mandate is to monitor the province's parks as well as the AFA's success in implementing the Master Plan.

Dr. Vidar Nordin, Dean of the Faculty of Forestry at the University of Toronto, was appointed as Chairperson of the newly created AFA by Natural Resources Minister Bernier within one week of Bill 155 receiving Royal Assent. In addition, Bernier announced the membership of the Authority's Board of Directors, composed primarily of high-profile individuals in the forest industry and politicians with some representation from citizen groups. Dr. Nordin named I.D. Bird, a forester working for a private forestry company in Quebec, as general manager of the Authority in March, 1975 and

announced that the Town of Huntsville would be the location of the AFA headquarters.²²

The government of Ontario provided the new Authority with an initial start up grant of \$600,000 which has since been paid back. A line of credit was also established between the AFA and the province which allows the AFA to borrow funds for operational purposes, which must be repaid with interest each year.²³

In general, members of the forest industry perceived the new approach to the management of Algonquin Park as a workable compromise which allowed all users of the Park to co-exist. Not all industry representatives agreed with this assessment, however, as concerns developed regarding the impact that government involvement would have on the cost of wood to the industry. Moreover, some loggers felt that the AFA signalled an overall increase in government involvement in forestry within the province. Conservationists claimed that while the Master Plan contained some positive changes, the Act allocated far too little of the Park to public and recreational use.²⁴

Partnership Operation

The Algonquin Forestry Authority Act of 1974 establishes the AFA as a Crown Corporation responsible for land management and forest harvesting within the park. It does so by a) zoning the park into a number of areas,

some exclusively for recreation and others for both recreation and logging, and b) putting the administration of the logging under a specially created corporation. The AFA harvests forest products and supplies them to industries dependent upon the forest resources of the park. Much of the actual harvesting is carried out under contract with local companies. The Authority must conduct all its operations in conformity with the Algonquin Park Master Plan which attempts to balance the interest of the public.

The context within which the AFA performs these operations is complex and has been evolving since its conception. The Master Plan functions as the umbrella under which all resource issues must fall. This document considers all uses, including recreational, hunting, trapping, and logging, and sets the parameters within which all management documents must be developed. It is reviewed every five years by the Provincial Parks Council and recommendations for changes are made to the Minister.

Specific management direction regarding forestry is then provided within a Forest Management Plan which was completed by the Authority in 1979. The current plan is valid until the year 2000 although it is reviewed every five years by the AFA. Ultimate approval authority for this document also rests with the Minister.

While the Master Plan and the Forest Management Plan provide guidelines and parameters for land management within the park, the

conveyance to the Authority of the responsibility for planning, management and execution of forest management on the ground is contained in a Forest Management Undertaking (FMU). This document sets out the terms and conditions of the AFA's responsibilities, including such issues as funding sources and reporting systems. The FMU is reviewed every five years by the AFA and approved by the Minister.

More precise detail in terms of where, when and how forest management will be completed is provided within a Timber Management Plan (TMP). The TMP is prepared by the Authority in accordance with a Timber Management Planning Manual for Crown Lands in Ontario and involves fairly extensive public input. The TMP provides both a long-term (20 year) framework and short-term (5 year) detail. It requires that the Authority prepare annual operating plans which are approved by the Board of Directors of the AFA and the District Office of the OMNR.

Initially, the Board of Directors of the AFA was comprised of ten members including the chairperson. Volunteers were not publicly solicited; rather they were handpicked by the Premier. Criteria for selection of the original Board appear to be scientific or business expertise. Through the years, however, greater emphasis has been placed on representation and while there are no designated representatives from various stakeholder groups, the current board appears to reflect a consideration of geographic, gender and

native issues. Environmental interests are not formally represented. Appointments, which are usually for two or three years, have recently been advertised and selection of the candidates continues to be at the discretion of the Premier.²⁵

The Authority itself is comprised of a General Manager and a staff of approximately twenty employees, including foresters, technicians and other support staff. The General Manager reports directly to the Board of Directors, while the Chairperson of the Board reports to the Minister of Natural Resources. These relationships are specified in the various documents which convey and direct the AFA's authority. A recent review of the FMU, completed by an independent consulting firm, found that there was some confusion and disagreement between the AFA and the OMNR over the role of the government in supervising and directing the AFA. While there was disagreement, however, a cooperative working relationship has developed between the field staff in the two organizations.²⁶

The same review found that there was a high degree of understanding regarding the ground rules for day-to-day operation among AFA staff. Differences in accounting procedures have presented occasional difficulties between the two organizations when expenditure reviews are performed and recommendations have been made to rectify this situation.²⁷

The Forest Management Undertaking Agreement (FMU) provides three

funding mechanisms for the Authority's activities; a) retained stumpage or Crown Dues, b) supplementary funding allocated by the OMNR, and c) retained surpluses from previous years. Until recently, the AFA funded core programs from retained stumpage and applied to the OMNR for funding for silviculture.²⁸ Recently, the two organizations have developed a rate schedule for various activities. The AFA provides the OMNR with a Schedule of Operations for which the OMNR provides block funding over and above that which can be provided from retained stumpage.²⁹

The Authority performs a variety of functions which could be classified as either collaborative, advisory or operational in nature. At the most basic level, it is responsible for the harvesting and commercial distribution of the forest resources. In addition, the Authority is responsible for maximizing the long-term health and value of the forest. In satisfying these roles, the AFA is involved in advising the OMNR regarding new policies, planning and decision-making within its area of responsibility. In the early 1980's, the OMNR formally delegated responsibility for operational silviculture (selection and marking of trees for harvest, tree planting, etc.) to the Authority, relinquishing additional decision-making authority.

The reporting relationships between the AFA General Manager, the Board of Directors and OMNR further enhance the authority of the AFA by enabling it to bypass District and Regional government offices should such

action be considered necessary. In fact, this sidestepping of government bureaucracy has occurred only occasionally when OMNR and AFA staff have been unable to reach an agreement on a significant issue. However, AFA staff feel that the existence of this political avenue for conflict resolution has resulted in a greater effort by the OMNR to compromise and pursue mutually agreeable solutions to major problems.³⁰

On average, the level of satisfaction with the new management arrangement for Algonquin Park has been high among the OMNR, the AFA and industry. The operational nature of the partnership enables both Board members and the public to see tangible results. In addition, quarterly reports are prepared for the Board and Annual reports which are audited by the Provincial Auditor are prepared for the OMNR.

Despite general agreement on the success of the partnership, the AFA and the OMNR continue to disagree on issues such as road construction. Usually these conflicts are resolved through a process of negotiation. AFA staff contend that it is sometimes difficult to remain an "honest broker", maintaining an arm's length from both government and industry, but are satisfied with their performance in this area despite claims from both sectors that they are partial to the concerns of the other side.³¹

While AFA staff expected resistance to their new responsibilities within the industry, they note that, in fact, government staff resistance has been

much greater. This resistance often originates with field level staff who had been performing silviculture activities prior to the AFA assuming responsibility in this area. Antagonism has also been noted among more senior government officials who are not in favour of the direct reporting relationship between the Chairperson of the Authority and the Minister of Natural Resources.³² Industry representatives have also noted some resistance to the AFA within the OMNR and feel that as long as the government maintains the current level of control over the AFA's activities, forest operations and the industry will continue to be delayed by the 'red tape' of bureaucracy.³³

Senior officials within the OMNR note that, on occasion, the public continues to hold the OMNR responsible for activities performed by the AFA in which the OMNR had no direct involvement. Furthermore, a small number of OMNR staff do not feel that the partnership has resulted in a greater degree of understanding among stakeholder groups regarding opposing points of view.³⁴

The Algonquin Wildlands League has publicly acknowledged that the most recent Timber Management Plan developed by the Authority provides a model for forest management. However, the organization still maintains that logging activities do not belong within a provincial park setting and that the government sold out to the forest industry.³⁵

In an attempt to promote a positive public attitude regarding its activities and to mediate continuing criticism by environmental groups, the AFA has begun to emphasize public relations as a significant component of its work program. To this end, it is publishing a quarterly newsletter outlining its initiatives and accomplishments, has developed a video entitled "Maintaining The Balance", and is involved to a greater degree in community education programs. In addition, it has just completed a logging museum in cooperation with the OMNR and an organization called the "Friends of Algonquin Park". The museum is intended to educate the public about the origins and significance of logging in Canada.

TUPPER/SHIELDS COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

The Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee is fairly typical of the types and nature of partnerships within the OMNR which have been established with the intention of sharing power but which function merely in an advisory capacity. Unlike other partnerships considered in this thesis, however, it was established following a fairly brief period of public concern and attention to the Tupper/Shields Crown Management Unit. The committee itself consists of a large number of interested stakeholders with conflicting goals and objectives. Broadly stated, the committee's mandate is the co-management of natural resources within the Tupper/Shields area by

proposing, planning and implementing resource management initiatives.

History

The Tupper/Shields Crown Management Unit falls within the jurisdiction of the Sault Ste. Marie District of the OMNR. The District includes 4,920 square kilometres of land, of which sixty-five percent is crown land. The forest industry, including logging, paper manufacturing, and saw and veneer mills, is a major employer in the area. In addition, substantial income is generated as a result of the tourism industry.³⁶

A District Land Use Guideline (DLUG) completed in 1983 provides the framework within which specific resource management plans, such as Timber Management Plans (TMPs), must operate. The DLUG identifies where, and in what manner, the OMNR may use Crown land. The original intent of the OMNR was that the DLUG would be reviewed and updated periodically. However, staff shortages and a heavy cyclical workload have precluded this review from occurring. While the DLUG provides guidelines with which specific resource management plans are expected to comply, the document has no legal status.

Forestry has been the primary activity within the Tupper/Shields area since the early 1900's. Forestry companies such as St. Mary's Paper and Lajambe Forest Products are conveyed the rights to forest resources within the area in Orders in Council or Timber Supply Agreements which are

reviewed and approved by the Provincial Cabinet. Because the Tupper/Shields area is a Crown unit, the Crown, in this case the OMNR, is responsible for preparing the Timber Management Plan.³⁷

Recently, a 'soft wilderness' tourism industry has developed within the Crown unit. The Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation maintains that mountain bike trails in the area are some of the best in North America.³⁸ Furthermore, there has been continuing pressure for the development of an all-season recreational facility at Searchmount, a village located within the Crown unit.³⁹

During the preparation of the 1990-95 TMP in the late 1980's, the Tupper/Shields area did not generate much public interest or concern. However, two years later conflicts developed when the previous owners of Lajambe Forest Products requested the development of a logging road south of Weckstrom Lake. The TMP did not identify access roads to a particular area within the unit, and an amendment to the TMP identifying a road required full public input. A draft map of the proposed road was advertised in the local papers, resulting in a substantial amount of resistance from a small group of cottagers and recreationists. The OMNR had failed to realize that the proposed access road was almost 'on top' of the cottagers' private road. Moreover, many of the cottagers and some full-time residents in the area were involved in the recreational industry (e.g. ski trails) and were

adamantly opposed to any endangerment of the area's wilderness value.

One landowner in particular vocalized concerns about the proposed road and the forest allocations in the TMP. Actively involved in the environmental movement, this individual was a participant in provincial-level land use planning exercises by virtue of her conservationist perspective. To solicit support and organize the affected landowners, she conducted local meetings and approached the OMNR as the spokesperson for this group.

In response to this outcry, the OMNR deferred the decision regarding an access road and shortly thereafter the forestry company was sold. In June 1991, the OMNR held an open house in Searchmount regarding alternative locations for an access road to the area in question. Public input was varied and expressed a number of concerns regarding both short-term and long-term management of the area. In response to a proposal for co-management of the area from a member of the public present at this meeting, the OMNR made a commitment to pursue some type of joint management process which might alleviate the conflicts surrounding forest management in the area. The concept of a co-management committee was developed by the Ministry within a few months of this open house.

Partnership Creation

Following the development of terms of reference for the committee, the OMNR began the process of selecting individuals to represent the various

interests within the Crown unit. The District Manager appointed members representing a small number of occupations which were not organized and could not, therefore, formally delegate representation. In addition, representatives of geographic areas within the Crown unit were approached individually by OMNR staff and asked to participate in the committee. The remaining groups or organizations appointed their own representatives.

At the present time, the committee consists of thirteen individuals including a chairperson. An area supervisor within the OMNR was appointed chairperson for an initial period of six months, following which the committee was to select a chairperson from outside the committee structure. The tourist industry, environmentalists and the forest industry are fairly evenly represented on the committee. Aside from the chairperson, the OMNR was to occupy a single seat on the committee. Every attempt to select an alternative chairperson has resulted in the OMNR staff member being reinstated in the position.

The terms of reference for the committee were developed by OMNR staff and presented to the committee for approval during its initial meeting. While the document was approved by the committee, there were attempts at this meeting to expand the scope of the committee's mandate. As no changes were made to the terms of reference, some committee members continue to feel that the interests of everyone are not reflected in the document.⁴⁰

Partnership Operation

The Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee is guided by formal terms of reference which outline the partnership's objectives, the committee structure, the chairperson's responsibilities and the decision-making process. Perhaps to accommodate a very divergent group of individuals, the terms of reference are very general. Broadly stated, the partnership was established to assist the OMNR to achieve excellence in the management of natural resources within the Crown unit. There are no specific goals or timeframes identified.

Despite the fact that the terms of reference identify the committee as a **full partner** to the OMNR, no formal authority or responsibility has been delegated to the committee within the document. Moreover, the terms of reference specifically state that the OMNR will accept the recommendations of the committee as advice only and may accept or reject that advice.⁴¹ Formal delegation of authority is not a requirement of collaborative partnerships if substantial influence can be exercised by the partners as a result of the government refraining from exercising control of the partnership. However, further discussion of the operation of this arrangement will illustrate that the OMNR has chosen not to refrain from exercising control of the partnership and in doing so, limits the ability of the partners to participate in government decision-making.

The committee meets once every four or six weeks at the call of the chairperson. The agenda is set by the OMNR; however, most items for discussion have been introduced to the committee at a previous meeting. Discussion is open and informal and while consensus on issues is sought, it is seldom achieved. Often there is reluctant agreement among members to a compromise which has been offered by industry or the OMNR. In cases where no agreement can be reached, recommendations are made to the District Manager of the OMNR by the Chairperson, but dissenting views are also expressed.⁴² As consensual decision-making is fundamental to collaborative partnerships, it is evident that this particular arrangement cannot be considered truly collaborative in nature.

Discussion usually revolves around some area of conflict between the forest industry or the OMNR and the remaining representatives. These conflicts are frequently sorted out at the table and no recommendations result from the discussion. However, some committee members note that the OMNR and industry representatives often pursue issues and reach agreements outside of the committee process, presenting the outcome of these discussions to the partners as information only. Partners are, therefore, further denied the opportunity of exercising influence in the decision-making process. On occasion, individual representatives have bypassed the committee structure and approached either the media or the Minister of Natural Resources

directly. Incidents such as these have resulted in a great deal of animosity among the members.⁴³

There appears to be some agreement among participants in the partnership regarding a commitment to environmental preservation. However, the extent to which this commitment is translated into either business activities or the willingness of the members to compromise varies. Furthermore, the meaning of sustainable development, which is a guiding principle within the OMNR, differs for most members. As a result, finding solutions which are satisfactory to all members has been extremely difficult.

None of the committee representatives reports on a regular basis to his or her respective organizations. In some cases, the representatives are the senior individuals within the organization and, as such, make decisions within the partnership with a certain amount of autonomy. These individuals do not feel that there is anyone in their organizations to whom they should be reporting.⁴⁴ Representatives of unorganized areas or industries have no forum for reporting to the people they represent regarding the committee's activities. In addition, there is little media coverage regarding the partnership, making it difficult for representatives of geographic areas to keep the general public informed. The committee produces no annual reports or other documentation regarding its activities with the exception of the minutes of committee meetings.

The extent and nature of the power that each participant brings to the partnership vary greatly. While the OMNR sits on the committee as a single member only, its continued involvement in chairing the committee provides it with an opportunity to control and direct committee activities. Furthermore, the OMNR is the only organization represented which has approval authority under various statutes and regulations regarding the issues which are often presented for discussion. As a result, the OMNR ultimately retains final decision-making authority regarding most issues. Representatives of the forest industry also bring substantial influence to the partnership by virtue of their impact on the economy of the area. The tourism industry, while not nearly as significant in size as the forest industry, is growing and promises to employ even greater numbers in the future. The remaining representatives possess no direct power short of that which stems from their ability to influence and mobilize the public.

While many participants express a greater understanding of opposing perspectives as a result of this partnership, this understanding was not displayed during interviews. Every committee member interviewed expressed some underlying bias against at least one group participating in the partnership. Furthermore, representatives of the general public and unorganized industries such as trapping exhibited a significant lack of understanding of both the mandate and the planning processes within the

OMNR.

To date, the committee has initiated only one project of an operational nature. This project involved planting trees in an area which had been particularly affected by logging operations. Only the OMNR and the forest industry participated in the project. Other representatives either felt that this activity was not within the committee's mandate or that it was the responsibility of the companies involved to regenerate the area.⁴⁵

Representatives of unorganized industries and specific geographic areas had no formal relationship with the OMNR prior to their involvement in the partnership. However, two of these individuals, also representing environmental interests, have participated in various planning processes in the past. Neither of these individuals describes his or her previous relationship as being adversarial and both feel that the partnership has helped them to understand government processes better. These individuals also support the view that their involvement in the partnership has enabled them to critique government policy from a more knowledgeable position. While they are pleased to have the opportunity to participate in planning, they are extremely dissatisfied with the extent to which that participation has resulted in policy changes at the local level. Specifically, they note that this partnership has not provided a format for dealing with the underlying land use planning issue.⁴⁶

Industry representatives have been involved in policy planning with

government for some time and do not feel that this partnership has altered that relationship in any way. These individuals also support the belief that 'knowledge is strength', and that involvement in the partnership has allowed them to criticize government policy in a more informed and constructive manner. However, they also noted that many people find it difficult to critique a 'partner' and would not be comfortable functioning as both a partner and a critic.⁴⁷

Government representatives note that the committee has met their performance expectations only because those expectations were low. The remaining partners, including industry representatives, are unsatisfied with the committee's performance, its objectives and its structure. While some decisions are being made more consensually than before by virtue of the input provided by the committee, the majority of the partners exercise very little influence on government decision-making. Moreover, significant conflicts continue to exist and fundamental differences in philosophy make compromise among stakeholders difficult.⁴⁸

This chapter has examined two public partnerships which staff of the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources feel satisfy the criteria associated with collaborative partnerships. The Algonquin Forestry Authority represents a truly collaborative partnership in which decision-making authority has been

formally delegated in supporting legislation to a newly created body. This partnership, the only one of its kind involving the OMNR, has gradually increased the nature and extent of power which the Authority possesses and may represent a change in direction within the government towards real power-sharing.

The second partnership, the Tupper/Shield Co-operative Management Committee, is more representative of the type and character of partnerships which OMNR staff consider to be collaborative. In fact, it is apparent that this partnership is not collaborative at all considering the lack of power-sharing which exists as a result of the arrangement. Rather, the structure and operation of the partnership dictates that it function in a limited advisory capacity.

The concept of a partnership continuum was introduced in Chapter Two.

Power, or the degree to which power is shared as a result of the partnership, is fundamental to these agreements, and would form the basis for placement of a particular arrangement on the continuum. The continuum illustrates that while one type of partnership may generally result in greater levels of power-sharing than another, this will not always be the case.

The two partnerships considered in this chapter provide a useful example of the degree of variance in power-sharing which results from specific partnership arrangements. The Algonquin Forestry Authority, with its clearly

defined responsibilities and legal authority, exhibits significant delegated authority and would appear at one end of the continuum. While the Tupper/Shields Co-operative Management Committee was established to function as a **full partner**, the terms of reference which define its existence clearly limit its authority and relegate it to the position of advisor. Furthermore, the ability of the partners to exercise influence on government decision-making is limited by such factors as the committee structure, and the extent to which the government has chosen to retain control of the policy area. As a result, this partnership exhibits far less power-sharing than many consultative or operational partnerships in which a high degree of influence results from the arrangement.

It is apparent from this examination that the ability of categories to represent adequately all types of partnership arrangements is limited. It is also apparent that merely expressing a desire to power-share is not sufficient to determine the outcome of a partnership. The intention to enter into collaborative arrangements must be reinforced in both the structure and operation of the partnership. Partnerships often possess qualities associated with more than one partnership category or evolve with time from one type to another. However, in most cases partnerships of a particular type do possess common characteristics and can, therefore, be evaluated and analyzed from that perspective. Discussion regarding the political implications of these

partnerships and an assessment of their success will be provided in chapters six and seven.

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Chapter Four

CONSULTATIVE PARTNERSHIPS

Consultative partnerships, while not involving the direct sharing of power associated with collaborative agreements, are nonetheless significant by virtue of their proliferation within the public sector. OMNR staff have estimated that approximately 45 percent of that ministry's partnership agreements are consultative in nature.¹ In addition, consultative partnerships present an opportunity for non-governmental actors to influence government decision-making, thereby exercising some degree of power. The extent and nature of this influence will determine if partnerships of this type will evolve into agreements in which power is shared more directly or formally.

Consultative partnerships provide a forum in which the government solicits advice from outside sources such as non-governmental organizations, groups and individuals. Unlike collaborative agreements, control in these arrangements is retained by the government. The degree of influence exercised by non-governmental partners is determined by such things as whether the agreement is formalized, the extent of public interest in the issue, the credibility of the partners and whether the results of the partnership are made public.² If non-governmental partners exercise substantial influence, there is greater potential for the consultative partnership to evolve into a more

collaborative arrangement.

Within the OMNR, as in many public organizations, this type of agreement usually takes the form of advisory councils or citizens' committees that advise the government regarding a specific policy issue. All the consultative partnerships submitted in the District survey consisted of more than four partners and most fulfilled a mandate which related to the management of a particular resource or area. Occasionally, consultative partnerships within this ministry have been established as a co-management initiative with the intention that non-governmental partners will assume progressively greater degrees of responsibility until the partnership becomes truly collaborative.

This chapter will examine two consultative partnerships within the OMNR; namely, the Magpie Co-management Committee in Wawa and the Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee in Welland, Ontario. The social and political environment within which each partnership was conceived and the key individuals or agencies involved will be reviewed. In addition, the objectives, structure and operation of these two arrangements will be discussed.

MANAGEMENT IN THE MAGPIE FOREST

The Magpie Co-Management Committee is a partnership whose creation

was long and painful. Following years of animosity which culminated in a public demonstration and the destruction of public property, this partnership was born of necessity. The partnership itself consists of a committee of interested stakeholders whose mandate includes the cooperative management of natural resources such as timber and fisheries in the Magpie Forest. A management area which includes all the contentious areas provides the physical boundaries of the committee's jurisdiction.

History

The Magpie Forest is a 3875 square kilometre tract of land surrounding the town of Dubreuilville in northern Ontario, and falls within the jurisdiction of the Wawa District of the OMNR. Dubreuilville, located approximately 75 km northeast of the anglophone community of Wawa, is almost exclusively francophone. Dubreuilville's economy is dominated by the logging industry established by the Dubreuil brothers in the early 1950's. Activities such as hunting, fishing and trapping are an integral part of the culture of the local residents, many of whom feel they have an inherent right to gain access to the surrounding land for these purposes.

Almost 100% of the available labour force in the village is employed directly or indirectly by Dubreuil Forest Products. The company holds a Forest Management Agreement (FMA) licence for most of the forest within the Magpie Management Unit. The FMA requires the company to prepare

Timber Management Plans (TMP) which identify areas for harvest and renewal, road construction, road use and a variety of mitigating measures aimed at reducing the impact of the harvest on other resource users. Any change in these policies requires a formal amendment to the TMP.

The OMNR has continually had to reconcile the ongoing conflicts between resource users. For example, the area supported one of the largest concentrations of remote (fly-in) tourism facilities in Northern Ontario. The remote tourism industry in the North Algoma area spent \$8.1 million in 1988 to conduct normal operations and capital improvements. Moreover, 95 percent of its clientele is from the north central United States, qualifying the industry as a net earner of foreign exchange and as a contributor to the reduction of Ontario's tourism deficit.³

Owners of these facilities had concerns about the protection of their operations from timber management activities and from excessive pressure by road based recreationists such as anglers and hunters. Logging operations and their access roads were gradually appearing closer to remote lakes thereby providing opportunities for local residents to obtain access to previously inaccessible lakes. The tourist operators claimed this was costing them customers and income. In addition, they complained that the TMP process was not conducive to receiving and considering comments from unorganized groups such as theirs, due to strict time constraints which often

conflicted with the demands of their industry.

In order to protect the backcountry setting of these facilities, the Wawa District regulated public use on roads which Dubreuil Forest Products built to access their harvest areas. These controls initially took the form of gates and signs and were intended to prevent local residents from accessing "designated" lakes. Because restrictive signs alone were more acceptable to local anglers and hunters, they soon began replacing gates despite the fact that the effectiveness of signage alone was questioned by the tourism industry. Three gates remained on roads north of Dubreuilville and these gates seemed to provide the impetus for a major confrontation between recreationists, tourism operators and the OMNR.

The use of gates on these three roads was initially approved in the 1984–1989 Forest Operating Plan and subsequently renewed in the 1989–1994 Timber Management Plan. The plans underwent public input and review at four stages in the process, and were approved by the OMNR despite escalating concerns by local residents and remote tourism operators. Each year gates were vandalized and each year Dubreuil Forest Products, under the direction of the OMNR, replaced them.

Local media coverage of the growing conflicts between resource users was substantial. In addition, letters from residents of Dubreuilville were published in the Toronto Star and a 400 name petition signed by residents

was submitted to both the District Office and the Minister.

The conflicts came to a head on September 16, 1989, when more than 130 residents of Dubreuilville (mostly members of the Rod and Gun Club) and media representatives, including the CBC, converged on the three remaining gates. Using cutting torches, the demonstrators completely destroyed the gates and burned the signs in a bid to force the OMNR's hand.

The situation in Dubreuilville was aggravated when three tourist outfitters requested that the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) 'bump up' the Magpie Forest Timber Management Plan to an individual environmental assessment (EA). As the OMNR was operating under an Interim Exemption Order which allowed it to proceed with TMP's as long as conditions associated with a Class EA were followed, a 'bump up' would subject both the OMNR and the forest company to long delays and additional costs. This 'bump up' request was eventually denied by the Minister of the Environment provided the OMNR comply with a number of conditions, including incorporating a stakeholders' committee into the planning process. However, this decision was made almost fifteen months after the Magpie Co-management Committee was established.

The OMNR attempted to resolve the road access issue by initiating an amendment to the 1989-1994 TMP which would change road access mechanisms from gates to signage only. However, support for the

amendments was almost equally divided between the remote tourism operators and the local residents. As a result, the OMNR did not get the required public support for approval of the amendment. It was at this point that the Regional Director for the Sudbury Region of the OMNR established the Magpie Co-Management Committee.

Partnership Creation

While partnerships are generally established with existing organizations, there are occasions when a new organization must be created to facilitate the partnership. The lack of any organized, cohesive unit of remote operators presented a problem when selecting designated representatives of the industry. As a result, the OMNR and the Ministries of Tourism and Recreation and Northern Development and Mines jointly funded a Remote Tourism Industry Association (RTIA), essentially establishing a pressure group. Pressure groups are a fundamental component of Canadian politics in that they provide the day-to-day connections between government and private citizens.⁴ By establishing and funding the RTIA, the OMNR created an organization which would pursue its own interest and seek to influence public policy in a manner congruent with those interests. In addition, these ministries subsidized the hiring of a tourism coordinator whose mandate included representing the industry in the new co-management setting.

The OMNR then hired a consultant to select committee members and to

ensure that all pertinent interests were represented. Public notices sought volunteers and a cross-section of ten individuals was selected on the basis of criteria established by the consultant. The OMNR sits as a single member of the committee. A two-day workshop provided the forum for the development of a mission statement, objectives and an action plan for the committee.

Partnership Operation

The Magpie Co-management Committee does not utilize formal terms of reference. Rather, a mission statement defines their overall purpose as the enhancement of social, economic and environmental values within the area. This broad objective is to be achieved by soliciting public input and by planning, advocating and initiating projects which strengthen the OMNR's ability to meet its management objectives.⁵

The key thrusts of the committee's work for the first five years is outlined in a series of seven goals which are more specific in nature than the mission statement. These goals include such things as the development of a commonly agreed upon definition of 'remoteness', and the determination of the sustainable level for all significant resources in the area. Implementation or action plans provide even greater levels of detail, identifying time frames and individuals responsible for the various activities of the committee.⁶

Decisions are made consensually by the committee. In the event that a

consensus cannot be reached, committee members have agreed to refer the issue to the OMNR. To date, there have been no occasions requiring a referral of this type.

The members of the committee, with the assistance of the consultant hired by the OMNR, developed a sociogram outlining the various concerns and roles relating to the Magpie Forest and exhibited a high degree of understanding of the extent and nature of the conflicts (See Appendix G). In addition, roles and responsibilities were developed for both the committee members and the chairperson.

The Magpie Co-management Committee plays both an advisory and an operational role, providing input into the OMNR's planning processes and performing various projects such as restocking lakes. During the first and second years, the OMNR provided \$20,000 and \$8,000 respectively in seed money for the projects undertaken by the committee and maintains that it will continue to fund as necessary.⁷

The ongoing operation of the committee is such that the OMNR usually refers resource management issues falling within the jurisdiction of the Magpie Forest to the committee. Recommendations relating to these issues are achieved by consensus of the group and are then presented to the OMNR for approval. While the OMNR retains final authority regarding all proposals, the consensual nature of the committee recommendations would

make any attempt by the OMNR to disregard the recommendations difficult. To date, every recommendation which has not conflicted with the OMNR's policies or objectives has been implemented.⁸

Prior to the establishment of the Magpie Co-management Committee, timber management planning for the forest proceeded according to the requirements outlined in a draft TMP Manual developed by the OMNR. These requirements include public participation at each stage in the planning process. The public is initially invited to participate through advertisements in the local media. Once the planning process is underway, public input is solicited in 'open houses'.⁹

While this system did allow for public input, that input tended to be fragmented and diffused by the fact that neither the remote tourism operators nor the road based recreationists in Dubreuville was organized into a cohesive group. For example, each tourism operator had concerns which were specific to his or her lake(s) which may have been very different from the concerns of a fellow operator. Following the establishment of the RTIA, two individual members of the industry as well as the tourism coordinator represented the interests of the industry as a whole on the co-management committee.

All of the partners bring some degree of power or influence to the table during committee meetings, but the extent and nature of that power varies

greatly from one partner to another. This has been perceived by several members of the committee and senior management staff within the OMNR as presenting a source of problems. Dubreuville Forest Products possesses a significant amount of influence by virtue of the fact that decisions which would be deleterious to its timber interests could result in significant economic impact within the community. The remote tourism operators, while generating some employment in the area, do not function on the same scale as the forest company; nor is their economic impact isolated to one geographic area. However, all partners do exercise some influence based on their credibility with members of the public and their ability to alter public opinion regarding OMNR policy.

The committee submits no regular reports for either the OMNR or for the organizations which the members represent. OMNR has relied on the circulation of committee minutes, informal discussions with the OMNR representative on the committee and good communications between the committee chairperson and the District Manager as a means of keeping informed on committee activities.¹⁰ However, the committee is currently investigating the establishment of a weekly newspaper column in an attempt to keep the public informed regarding their activities. Furthermore, public notices of committee meetings now invite members of the public to attend and participate.

Since the creation of the committee, two of the most vocal tourism operators selected to represent the industry on the committee have resigned. Both these individuals cite frustration with the pre-existing planning processes as the main reason for their reluctance to be involved. In addition, they feel that the establishment of the committee was an attempt by the OMNR to buy public support for timbering. These two individuals continue to criticize government policy regarding resource management, but feel that they had to resign from the committee to do so effectively.¹¹

Those individuals representing the interest of road-based recreationists also characterize their prior relationship with the OMNR as being adversarial in nature, largely due to the road access issue. These participants in the partnership continue to criticize OMNR policies but do not feel that their involvement in the committee has hindered their ability to do so in any way. Those organizations or individuals who conducted fairly cooperative relations with the government prior to the establishment of the committee report no significant change in this relationship.

The general level of satisfaction with both the committee and OMNR policy among the current committee members is fairly high. Most members are particularly satisfied with the success of operational projects such as fish restocking. In addition, the majority of the partners feel that the operation of the committee has enhanced their understanding of opposing interests and

resource issues regardless of whether their position on various issues has changed.

The committee's success in achieving its stated goals as outlined in the Planning Seminar Report has been varied. Three of the seven objectives identified by the committee related to the development and acceptance of commonly agreed upon definitions for concepts such as sustainable development. In light of ongoing debates throughout the country regarding sustainable levels of resource extraction, these goals were perhaps too ambitious for a committee of this nature. The remaining objectives dealt with tangible and measurable goals such as the development of road access strategies. The committee has been very successful in meeting and, in some cases, surpassing these objectives.

The initial two year term of the RTIA and the tourism coordinator expired in the spring of 1993. Funding for the association has not been renewed although discussions regarding a new term are ongoing. Without a formal organization, representing the interests of the remote tourist operators and maintaining an acceptable level of accountability to these individuals has become increasingly difficult.

The Terms of Reference for the 1994–2016 TMP formally acknowledge the Magpie Co-Management Committee as a partner to the OMNR's planning team. The committee's responsibilities are specified to include reviewing all

proposals, resource value maps, and draft plans, providing advice and recommendations on a variety of issues, and communicating pertinent information to the various user groups.¹²

WELLAND RIVER CLEANUP PLANNING COMMITTEE

While the majority of the OMNR's partnerships have been initiated by that ministry, the OMNR and most other government organizations participate in a variety of partnerships which have been established either by other government agencies or non-governmental organizations. It is for this reason that the Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee has been included in this thesis. The OMNR is neither responsible for the partnership formation nor its on-going operation. Nevertheless, the OMNR is a necessary participant in the partnership by virtue of its mandate to provide approvals under various pieces of legislation.

The partnership under examination consists of a planning committee of interested stakeholders as well as representatives of three levels of government. The mandate of the committee is two-fold in that it includes both the planning and review of all aspects of the remediation of sections of the Welland River.

History

Since 1979, process waters from Atlas Specialty Steels (Atlas) have been

treated and recycled within the Atlas plant or treated and discharged into the Welland River. Prior to 1979, however, discharge from Atlas went directly into the river along with process liquids from other area industries. The result of this untreated discharge was an unsightly buildup of solid materials often referred to as the 'Atlas Reef'.¹³

A Brock University professor, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), undertook a preliminary investigation of the sediments in the Welland River in the mid-1980's, and confirmed the existence of heavy metal contamination in the area of the Atlas sewer outfall.¹⁴ Shortly thereafter, a second professor from Brock University was commissioned to conduct research regarding the negative environmental impact of this contamination and found that contaminant sources other than Atlas were not predominant in the reef. Moreover, these heavy metals had resulted in a 'dead zone' area within the river system in which no life existed.¹⁵ In December, 1987, Atlas committed itself to a sediment cleanup in the area of the Atlas Reef, and initiated a number of investigations to determine the size and nature of the sediment and to examine cleanup options.¹⁶

The 1980's was a period of increasing environmental sensitivity for many Canadians. A number of environmental catastrophes, such as the burning of Sandusky Creek in Ohio, focused attention on the extent of pollution within

waterways on the continent.

The 1987 Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between Canada and the United States provided the impetus for coordinated efforts by governments to restore the integrity of the Great Lakes Basin. Reports by the International Joint Commission (IJC) identified 42 Areas of Concern in the basin, of which 17 are in Canada. Remedial Action Plans (RAPs) for the cleanup of these areas are currently being developed by RAP teams made up of scientific and technical staff from the three levels of government. Extensive public involvement is being accomplished by incorporating Public Advisory Councils (RAP-PACs) in the process. Funding is available for remediation projects, provided that a number of criteria are met such as the principle that the 'polluter pays' and that, whenever possible, funding partnerships are pursued.¹⁷

One of these Areas of Concern exists on the Niagara River and, as a result, a RAP team and a Public Advisory Council were established to coordinate the remediation of the river. As the Welland River is a tributary of the Niagara River, concern developed among governmental and non-governmental organizations regarding the presence of source contamination in the river.¹⁸ These concerns, the findings of research and investigations, and the commitment of Atlas to clean up sediment surrounding the reef, culminated in the establishment of the Welland River Cleanup Project

Planning Committee.

Partnership Creation

The Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is comprised of individuals representing Atlas, Brock University, the general public and various branches of the three levels of government. Initially, however, only Atlas, Brock University and the MOE were involved, meeting occasionally to discuss the status of research on the river.

In 1989 Atlas hired the consulting firm of Acres International Ltd. (Acres) to conduct investigations on the sediment and potential means of contaminant cleanup in the Welland River. Atlas, Acres and the MOE jointly decided to establish a broader-based planning committee which would facilitate greater levels of public involvement and would include important stakeholders such as the OMNR. Together with Acres and the MOE, Atlas began selecting representatives of the committee. Two citizens who lived on the river were invited to participate in the committee. No invitation to participate was issued to the general public until a recent Open House designed to expand the level of community support for the project. Representatives of all government agencies with approval authority relating to the cleanup were also solicited.

The committee was initially established as an ad hoc committee, designed to plan and oversee the completion of the reef cleanup by Atlas. However,

as investigations were conducted, it became apparent that the extent of contamination was greater than the visible section of the reef near the Atlas sewer outfall. As the extent and nature of the contamination expanded, so too did the scope of the committee's work. Additional government organizations, such as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, required representation on the committee to ensure that all pertinent interests would be heard. At the current time, the committee consists of twelve representatives of governmental organizations, and three representatives each of non-governmental organizations and the general public.

Partnership Operation

The Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is guided by neither terms of reference nor a mission statement of any kind. Perhaps because the committee was initially established on an ad hoc basis, the roles and responsibilities of the individual representatives and the committee as a whole have never been defined. There is general agreement among the members regarding the overall objectives of the committee, namely the planning and review of the Welland River cleanup. However, there are differences in the degree of emphasis placed on the committee's planning or advisory role. Some of the committee members feel that until the cleanup is actually underway, the committee will have accomplished little.¹⁹

Representatives of government agencies as well as Atlas and Acres have

been designated by their respective organizations. Approximately one half of these representatives report regularly to their organization regarding the committee's activities and/or recommendations. The remaining designated representatives follow no regular reporting procedures. Representatives of the general public have no forum for reporting to the public regarding the committee's activities.

A consultant from Acres functions as the Committee chairperson. Meetings are called as necessary and the format of the meetings varies. Committee members are usually presented with an update of events or research investigations. Discussion is open and informal and consensus on issues of significance is usually achieved. Acres addresses the committee's concerns in the project workplan and appropriate government approvals are sought for the next stage of the project. Occasionally, there has been a period of months between meetings if progress is delayed pending research findings or an investigation report.

Committee members exhibit a sound understanding of both the perspectives and mandates of other representatives. Many of the organizations, such as the OMNR and the MOE, work together frequently and are, therefore, familiar with legislation and procedures which apply to the other organizations. In other cases, this understanding has developed as a direct result of participation in the partnership.

While committee members are cognizant of each organization's role and responsibilities, not all of them are satisfied with the extent to which these mandates conflict. After three separate investigations of the river sediment it was determined that the associated area of contamination was substantially greater than originally anticipated. This resulted in a further investigation of the floodplain area in which contamination was found up to 30 metres from the riverbank.²⁰ Since the river and the floodplains are inextricably linked, remediation of the river cannot proceed unless the floodplain can be remediated at the same time.

The mandates and philosophies of many of the government organizations, however, address floodplain contamination and remediation differently. The MOE's approach is to remove contaminated material from the area, while Environment Canada's guidelines stipulate that the contaminants can be contained in the area so long as they cause no direct harm to the public. The OMNR's mandate, however, emphasizes that floodplain habitat would require replacement if dredgeate is removed.²¹ Until the issue of floodplain remediation is resolved, therefore, the committee cannot proceed further in either the planning or the implementation stage of the partnership.

The extent and nature of the power that each participant brings to the partnership varies greatly. Some of the agencies represented possess approval authority under various statutes and regulations. As a result, these agencies

can block the implementation of the clean up. The OMNR's legislative authority in this regard, for example, stems from the Lakes and Rivers Improvement Act and the Canada Fisheries Act. Environment Canada, OMNR, MOE and the Niagara Region Conservation Authority all possess authority sufficient to halt the progress of the project. Other members, such as those from the academic community, bring specific knowledge to the partnership which can influence both the public and the committee members. Perhaps the least able to exert influence within this partnership are those representing the public at large. These individuals possess no **special** knowledge, nor is their approval required at any stage in the process. Furthermore, without a great deal of media coverage, it has been difficult for these individuals to communicate to the general public either concerns or support for the cleanup project.

Citizen representatives on the committee had virtually no relationship with the various government agencies prior to their involvement in the partnership, while members of the academic community worked cooperatively with many of the agencies despite frequent criticism of government policies and/or procedures. The majority of the participants in this partnership are representatives of government agencies. Consequently, the partnership itself has had little impact on the nature of the relationship between these organizations. However, any attempt to plan a project in which so many

government agencies are involved has the potential of accelerating the progress of the project as the different jurisdictions debate, compromise and co-ordinate their efforts.

Both Atlas and the Regional Municipality of Niagara worked cooperatively with a number of these agencies, particularly the MOE, prior to the partnership. Despite the positive nature of their on-going relationship, both have had occasion to either criticize or resist government policy. Representatives of these two organizations now feel that the partnership has resulted in a greater level of understanding concerning the interests of their organizations and the government agencies involved.²²

The majority of the non-governmental partners still critique the policies of the various agencies of the government. Some feel that their position on the committee has made it difficult for them to be open in their criticism. Others support the belief that 'knowledge is strength', stating that their involvement in the partnership has made them more aware of government policy and its impact, thereby allowing them to criticize policy in a more informed and constructive manner.²³

In 1991, the committee secured \$.3 million from Environment Canada's Cleanup Fund to be combined with a substantial contribution by Atlas. The funds were used in the development of cleanup technology for the project and the completion of a dredging demonstration project in 1991 in which the

proposed technology was tested and approved. To date, Atlas Steel has committed \$1.7 million towards consultant fees, research and the demonstration project. No other agencies have contributed financial support. The OMNR did secure approval for a \$10,000 contribution to the project in 1992; however, their fiscal year ended before the funds could be utilized.²⁴

The four investigations which have been completed have clearly indicated that the area of contamination extends further upstream and downstream of the Atlas Reef than anticipated. In addition, studies have identified both floodplain contamination and the existence of other sources of pollution including the treatment plant belonging to the Regional Municipality of Niagara. At the present time, Atlas has withdrawn its financial support for consultant fees. Atlas has also postponed any cleanup activity until the extent of their liability and that of other polluters is determined.

The Committee is currently attempting to secure a chairperson from the Niagara Region Conservation Authority. It is felt that this organization, being a semi-autonomous body, would perform this function adequately.²⁵ The Committee is also attempting to expand the degree of both community awareness and community support for the project. To this end, the public was invited to attend an Open House which was held on June 26, 1993. The level of response by the general public was high. However, very few of the 114 industries and public agencies invited to attend the meeting made an

appearance.

This chapter has examined two consultative partnerships involving the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources. One of the partnerships, the Magpie Co-Management Committee, was established and funded by the OMNR. The second partnership, the Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee, while being established by organizations outside the OMNR, nonetheless requires its participation. These two partnerships are typical of the type and character of consultative partnerships in which the OMNR participates.

The Magpie Co-Management Committee has continued to evolve since its inception to become somewhat collaborative in nature. This is evidenced by the inclusion of the committee within the formal planning processes of the OMNR. Furthermore, this partnership illustrates the extent to which a partnership arrangement may possess criteria associated with more than one partnership category. The Magpie Co-Management Committee, while considered to be primarily consultative, performs a variety of operational functions and is assuming greater levels of decision-making responsibility.

The Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee is more limited both in its decision-making ability and its scope of operation. This particular partnership illustrates the need for ongoing evaluation and reassessment of partnership mandates to reflect accurately the changing environment within

which partnerships must function. Discussion regarding the political implications of these two partnerships and an assessment of their success will follow in chapters six and seven.

ENDNOTES

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21. Interview with Don Mar and Karen Watt, Atlas Specialty Steel, June 3, 1993.
22. Interview with Joe Furgal, Regional Municipality of Niagara, and Don Mar and Karen Watt, Atlas Specialty Steels, June 3, 1993.
23. Interview with Mrs. Waylan, Citizen Representative, June 28, 1993, Joe Furgal, Regional Municipality of Niagara, June 3, 1993 and Professor Dickman, Brock University, June 7, 1993.
24. Interview with Don Mar and Karen Watt, Op.Cit.
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Chapter Five**OPERATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS**

Staff within the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources estimate that approximately forty-five per cent of their existing partnerships are operational in nature. These partnerships are characterized by a sharing of work of a physical or non-physical nature and may also involve the sharing of financial or material resources. While operational partnerships usually result in the public organization retaining power, the non-governmental partners often exercise some degree of influence depending on the extent and nature of their operational involvement. Moreover, this type of arrangement, while not empowering the participants to the same extent as collaborative partnerships, may result in more efficient or responsive program delivery.¹

Within the OMNR, operational partnerships usually take the form of simple agreements between the Ministry and local organizations or citizens for the purpose of completing a specific operation. Very occasionally they are large scale agreements, such as U.S.-Canada joint rehabilitation ventures, requiring significant coordination and a sound legal foundation for the arrangement.

Partnerships which fall within other categories often exhibit characteristics common to operational partnerships. For example, many of

the collaborative partnerships examined involved the operational participation of the partners. Furthermore, operational involvement was often cited as a prerequisite to participant satisfaction in other types of partnership. The difference, therefore, between operational partnerships and collaborative or consultative arrangements lies in the degree to which partners are directly involved in policy development and decision-making and the extent to which power is shared.

This chapter will examine two operational partnerships within the OMNR, namely, the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility in Thunder Bay and the Goodyear Fishway in Bowmanville. Descriptive detail regarding the establishment, structure and operation of the two partnerships will be provided. The political implications, success factors and limitations of these partnerships will be discussed further in Chapters six and seven.

THE TROUT LAKE WASTE DISPOSAL FACILITY

The Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility presented the OMNR with a number of problems, not the least of which was funding. To alleviate the internal stresses which the Ministry faced as well as to satisfy public demands regarding the facility, the OMNR established a partnership with a community organization to share both the funding and the operation of the site while maintaining sole decision-making authority regarding its operation. As a

result, the facility has become a model which is being duplicated to various degrees both inside and outside the Thunder Bay District of the OMNR.

History

The OMNR is responsible for the operation and management of all dumping facilities on Crown land and in unorganized areas. The Ministry of the Environment (MOE) regulates these facilities. The Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site, located 15 km from the Thunder Bay City Dump, is only one of twenty-seven sites which the OMNR operates in that District. It serves both permanent and seasonal residents in Gorham, Ware, Fowler and Jacques Townships.

In 1974, the OMNR was issued a Provisional Certificate of Approval for the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site under the Environmental Protection Act (EPA) of 1971. The Certificate of Approval specifies the type of waste, site area and other variables while Regulation 309 of the EPA outlines the conditions of operation for such facilities. Trout Lake was certified to accept domestic waste only and the primary conditions of operation included the provision of good quality access roads to the site; restricted access which was limited to those times when an attendant is on duty; a "no-burn" site maintenance policy; and the enclosure of the facilities to prevent entry by unauthorized persons.²

While the "no-burn" policy was included in the regulations to prevent the

emission of toxic fumes into the environment, prior to 1987 it was seldom enforced. In fact, until 1987 the Trout Lake dump was operated in much the same manner as other facilities in unorganized areas, having no restrictions on users or types of waste.³ Consequently, waste disposal site inspection reports issued by the Ministry of the Environment (MOE) indicated that compliance with the Certificate of Approval was very poor.

With the 'greening' of public opinion in the mid 1980's, the MOE began to move towards stricter enforcement of its regulations. This was beginning to increase dump site maintenance costs for the OMNR in order to compact and cover waste materials and provide more 'environmentally friendly' facilities.

Despite this change in orientation, the Trout Lake dump remained a problem. Not only was the site constantly messy, but people often set fire to their refuse, leaving smouldering trenches and blowing garbage to create a fire hazard. Consequently, nearby residents often faced the threat of wildfires and were subjected to very malodorous and potentially noxious fumes. At times, the strewn garbage and smoke made it impossible to drive close to the site.

The dump site was also being heavily overused by residents of Thunder Bay and by commercial and industrial users who felt inconvenienced by the restrictions at the Thunder Bay site and who resisted paying the user fees in

place at that facility.

During one outbreak of dump burning, a minor explosion occurred and fumes of unknown chemicals were released into the air in the vicinity of the OMNR fire crews. The OMNR fire staff thereafter refused to extinguish fires at the Trout Lake site unless they were provided with training and adequate safety equipment such as breathing apparatus. Due to the seasonal nature of fire staff, however, the OMNR felt that thorough training for chemical fire management was unrealistic.

During 1986 and 1987, the property owners in the affected townships stepped up their campaign to force the OMNR to meet the requirements of the Certificate of Approval for the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site. Residents called the District Manager's home at all hours of the day and night to report fires at the dump and to register complaints. A series of meetings took place between the property owners, the OMNR and provincial politicians. Unfortunately, the OMNR's waste disposal program was chronically underfunded and this made compliance with all of the MOE's requirements difficult.

In 1988 an attendant was hired to supervise and direct users of the site and while the site remained open twenty-four hours a day, good coverage by the attendant was attempted through flexible scheduling during peak periods of use. Unfortunately, while use of the site improved during supervised

periods, success was limited due to the twenty-four hour access and lack of any enclosure or gate. This attempt at a solution was not only expensive, but unauthorized fires continued and the residents' campaign to rectify the situation intensified.

One year later the conditions at the site had not significantly improved. The Acting District Manager felt strongly that the MOE could not make an exception by allowing the OMNR to continue operating facilities in a manner which would result in enforcement action if undertaken by the private sector. The Lands Program Manager had a strong orientation towards consultative management and in an attempt to resolve the issue, he and the District Manager developed a strategy for the Trout Lake site which included the concept of regulated use of the site and the introduction of a user pay system.⁴ These restrictions were intended to be instituted gradually with restricted access only being implemented that year.

By the end of July, 1989, a gate was in place at the site. An attendant at the site distributed a questionnaire to site users regarding peak periods of use and in accordance with the results of this survey the site was open three days a week only, for eight hours each day. During the fall and winter, a local person was hired to open and close the gate during the days when dumping was allowed, but no attendant remained on the site.

Not all of the residents were pleased with either the decision to restrict

access, or the selection of days the site would be open. While they were all notified in writing of the changes in operation, some felt that they had not been adequately consulted prior to the decision being made. Despite the occasional letter, however, complaints dropped off, the number of unauthorized fires was greatly reduced and the volume of waste decreased substantially since Thunder Bay residents were no longer authorized to use the site. Site inspection reports by the MOE also improved. While these actions resolved the issue temporarily, the cost of providing an attendant at the site, even during peak seasons, was prohibitive. An alternative approach to site maintenance was required.

Partnership Creation

In March, 1990, OMNR staff sent a letter to 726 property owners within a defined usage area, outlining the problems the Ministry faced at the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site. Residents were presented with six options for solving the problems and were asked either to select one of the options or to submit an alternative strategy for resolution of the problem.⁵

The responses to the questionnaire overwhelmingly supported the option which proposed that the OMNR continue to operate the dump while upgrading that facility to satisfy the MOE Certificate of Approval. Funding would be provided either by a per-visit charge or a yearly permit fee. By May 3, 1990, residents were notified that the OMNR would accept their

choice, and permits were made available for sale. The local branch of the March of Dimes was initially offered a short-term contract for operation of the facility on a payment for service basis. The March of Dimes accepted this contract. The following year, OMNR staff again considered their options regarding the waste disposal site. At this time the concept of a long-term partnership between the OMNR and the March of Dimes was considered. A service agreement outlining the operation and maintenance responsibilities of each partner was developed by legal staff within the OMNR and presented to representatives of the March of Dimes.

Partnership Operation

A service agreement provides the legal and operational framework within which the OMNR and the March of Dimes partnership must function. The roles and responsibilities of each of the partners are outlined within this document while OMNR policies regarding financial management for revenue incentive initiatives provide guidelines for all financial statements for which the March of Dimes is responsible.

The purpose of the partnership, as defined within OMNR correspondence, is to manage and operate the facility in a manner which will mitigate a variety of physical and financial problems associated with the site as well as increase the level of public support for its continued operation.⁶

The March of Dimes sells annual permits directly to users. Permit

revenue is applied to operational expenses, and any excess may be used to fund other community programs being implemented by that organization. The OMNR provides any shortfall in funds generated by permit sales. In this way, both partners have a financial stake in the successful operation of the site.

The March of Dimes praises this partnership as an "opportunity for independence", maintaining that the arrangement not only provides them with an avenue for revenue generation, but also facilitates the training and employment of disabled persons.⁷ While the March of Dimes is responsible for the on-going operation of the facility, the OMNR provides material resources, professional advice, and, occasionally, human resources if they are needed for site maintenance or new initiatives. The OMNR continues to hold the Certificate of Approval for the facility. Decisions pertaining to the site's daily operation are made by the March of Dimes. However, the OMNR retains final decision-making authority and responsibility for the site and any new initiatives or changes in operation must be approved by that Ministry. Nevertheless, the success of the partnership and the level of both public awareness and support which it has achieved have made it difficult for the OMNR unilaterally to make decisions regarding the future of the facility.

The partnership has spawned greater public involvement and ownership in other areas typically existing within the domain of the public sector. For

example, a number of citizens, encouraged by the extent to which the public determined the future of the Trout Lake facility, have established a Trout Lake Recycling Committee. This committee is currently pursuing a large scale recycling program for materials deposited at the facility.

The March of Dimes prepares monthly financial statements outlining all expenses and revenue to the OMNR. In addition, reports regarding the operation of the facility are prepared for use within the March of Dimes organization.

Prior to the establishment of the partnership, the March of Dimes had no ongoing relationship with the OMNR. However, the organization has had occasion to criticize government in policy areas relating to their operations. The Trout Lake Waste Management partnership has not altered this criticism of other ministries in any way.

Since the establishment of this partnership, conditions at the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility have significantly improved. The site now satisfies all conditions associated with the Certificate of Approval. The volume of waste being deposited at the site has been greatly reduced as have maintenance and operational costs. Deposits of industrial or commercial waste are virtually non-existent as are unauthorized fires. The number of permits sold has been increasing since 1991 and while the March of Dimes has not yet had surplus revenue which can be applied to their community

programs, they hope to achieve this goal in the near future.⁸

The OMNR has benefitted from extremely positive public relations as a result of the establishment of this partnership. An editorial in a local newspaper states that the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility is not only a model dump; "it is an example of how and why people should assume a measure of responsibility for their own lives. It is a lesson in how government cannot be expected to be all things to all people, and why it should not be."⁹

THE GOODYEAR FISHWAY

The Goodyear Fishway is a device which allows the passage of particular species of fish through the Goodyear dam on the Bowmanville Creek in Ontario. Constructed and operated as a result of a partnership between the OMNR, the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association (BCAA) and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the fishway typifies operational partnerships within the OMNR.

History

Among anglers, rainbow trout is considered to be a highly sought game species. However, years of urban and rural development and the consequential damage to fish habitat have resulted in declining fish populations in many areas of the province. During the 1970's, the Lindsay

District of the OMNR was no exception. A number of streams flowing into Lake Ontario were producing very small populations of rainbow trout due to the presence of dams which the fish could not ascend. As rainbow trout require access both to streams for spawning and to a larger lake where they mature, the dams prevented the young and adult fish from migrating.

Streams which drained into Lake Ontario in the Coburg and Bowmanville areas presented anglers with potentially good trout spawning and rearing habitat. Two dams, namely, the Goodyear dam and the Vanstone dam, had raised the ire of anglers for years and in response to their complaints, OMNR staff manually transferred between two and three hundred fish over the two dams each year. Despite this manual transfer, complaints from anglers and sportswriters continued.¹⁰

During the early 1980's, a group of concerned sportspersons established the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association. Once established, this organization assumed the responsibility for the manual fish transfer, maintaining that the OMNR was not transferring enough fish to ensure an adequate population. Funding for the transfer was supplied to the organization from a Community Fisheries Involvement Program (CFIP) fund until 1985.

In 1985, the Vanstone dam washed out, leaving the Goodyear dam as the only barrier to rainbow trout in the river. For the next few years, the

Goodyear Co. agreed to open the dam for approximately one week each year to enable passage of the fish from Lake Ontario. This situation continued until the City of Bowmanville discovered that Goodyear had an unmetered water line, which meant that excesses of water which were used when the dam was open were not charged back to the company. Goodyear was informed by the City that continuing to open the dam annually would cost the company approximately \$1500. each year.¹¹

OMNR staff had been aware of the problems on the river for years and while they had considered the construction of a fishway at each of the dams, the cost was prohibitive. Costs associated with the construction of a single fishway at the Goodyear dam site ranged from \$100,000 to \$120,000, including labour. As the OMNR was in a period of fiscal constraint at the time, this option remained outside of the Ministry's means and a proposal by the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association to build a fishway with CFIP funding was declined.¹²

Partnership Creation

The partnership which led to the construction and operation of the Goodyear Fishway resulted not from the initiative of OMNR staff, but from the commitment of members of the anglers association. Once the CFIP proposal for a fishway was rejected, a small number of members of the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association began soliciting financial support for

the project from local businesses, municipalities and organizations. The OMNR was again approached, this time to enter into an arrangement whereby the OMNR and the Bowmanville Creek Anglers Association would jointly construct and operate a fishway which was funded primarily from donations.

The OMNR accepted the initiative and provided \$6,000 in CFIP funding towards the construction of the fishway. In addition, the OMNR signed a legal agreement between the OMNR and Goodyear allowing the construction of a fishway on the company's dam. Shortly thereafter, the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans requested that a sea lamprey trap be incorporated into the fishway, offering both financial and human resource support for the partnership.

Partnership Operation

The Goodyear Fishway partnership is guided by no formal agreement of any kind. A verbal agreement between staff of the OMNR and of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans on the one hand, and the President of the anglers association on the other, defines the roles and responsibilities of each of the partners. In fact, OMNR staff are unsure as to the legal status of the fishway in terms of ownership or liability.¹³

A variety of local businesses, the City of Newcastle, the OMNR and the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans provided the \$42,000 which was necessary for material costs and those portions of the fishway construction

which were contracted out. The three partners themselves also contributed volunteer labour whenever possible.

Decisions regarding the periods of operation of the fishway are generally made by the anglers association, but require the final approval of the OMNR. On no occasion has OMNR staff rejected such a recommendation. Both the OMNR and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans have provided expertise and material resources if maintenance of the fishway is required. During the construction of the fishway, the OMNR provided engineering and design staff while the anglers association provided a substantial amount of donated labour.

None of the partners follows any regular reporting procedures regarding the success or operation of the fishway to their respective organizations. OMNR staff cite funding and staff shortages as the reason that no regular monitoring of the success of the device is performed.¹⁴

Representatives of both the OMNR and the Anglers Association maintain that the partnership has resulted in a better understanding of the activities and interests of the other partners. OMNR staff, in particular, state that while they still receive criticism of their fisheries management policies by members of the anglers association, that criticism is no longer hostile in nature. Field staff in the public organizations appear to be relating to members of the anglers association as individuals as opposed to representatives of 'the government'. Members of the Anglers Association, on the other hand, are

more cognizant both of the responsibilities associated with the OMNR's mandate and the limitations it faces as a public organization.

This chapter has examined two operational partnerships involving the OMNR. Each of these partnerships typifies both the nature of and problems associated with operational partnerships. In the initial stages of the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Facility partnership, the operation of the site was merely contracted out to the March of Dimes. The relationship between the government and the March of Dimes could only be considered a partnership once a number of criteria were satisfied. These criteria include the presence of an ongoing relationship between the two organizations, shared risks and benefits, and continued operational involvement by the OMNR. This case illustrates the tendency to consider contracting out services to be a type of partnership.

The Goodyear Fishway provides an example of an operational agreement which falls within the confines of the centrally operated CFIP program. CFIP agreements were often cited in the District survey as operational partnerships. In many cases, however, these arrangements more accurately represent a type of sponsorship agreement in which the government organization funds a particular project to be undertaken by either an organization or an individual citizen. In the absence of any on-going relationship between participants or

any operational involvement on the part of the OMNR, these arrangements should not be considered to be partnerships of any type.

Both of these partnerships illustrate the narrow scope which is common to operational partnerships. Most agreements of this type are designed to implement a specific program or project. This characteristic of operational partnerships often results in a briefer relationship between the partners than either collaborative or consultative arrangements. It appears that regular interaction between the participants for the duration of the arrangement, operational involvement and the mutual sharing of risks and benefits are more significant criteria when determining if a particular arrangement constitutes an operational partnership. Discussion regarding the political implications of these partnerships and an assessment of their success will follow in chapters six and seven.

ENDNOTES

1. Kernaghan, Kenneth, "Partnership and Public Administration: Conceptual and Practical Considerations", Canadian Public Administration, Vol.36, No.1 (Spring):63.
2. Environmental Protection Act, Regulation 309, Revised Regulations of Ontario, 1980, as amended to O. Reg. 464/85.
3. Interview with Fream Brown, Lands Supervisor, Thunder Bay District, Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, January 28, 1993.
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5. Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources, News Release, March, 1990.
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Chapter Six

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: PUBLIC SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS

Partnerships are just one of a number of public sector initiatives which are changing the context of governance. A significant issue in the study of any one of these initiatives is the impact it will have on our system of government. Specifically, an examination should be made of the impact of management initiatives such as partnerships on the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility and the practice of public service accountability.

In addition, we must recognize that if partnerships progress to become part of a long-term strategy in government, they will influence not only the government's response to demands for programs and services, but also the nature of government's relationship with its clients and stakeholders. If partnership arrangements are successful, the relationship between government and stakeholders must necessarily become less paternal and dictatorial and more cooperative and consultative.

The inevitability of this change is due to the fact that true partnerships require a shift in power so that power, in the sense of decision-making authority, is shared among the partners. Furthermore, decision-making authority, which has traditionally rested within the domain of either elected officials or the public service, would be vested with individuals and groups

outside the government and, therefore, outside of the influence of parliamentary conventions.

This chapter will examine the traditions of ministerial responsibility and accountability and will determine, both in theory and in practice, how government– stakeholder partnerships affect these traditions. References will be made to the actual implementation of the partnership case studies outlined in chapters three, four and five.

In addition, this chapter will address assertions by some theorists that partnerships provide a mechanism for reducing public criticism of government policy by coopting the participants. The extent to which power has been shared as a result of the OMNR partnerships and the environment in which the partnerships were established will be examined to determine if interest group activity and/or political pressure contributed to their development. Lastly, this chapter will answer the question: Do partnerships truly alter the government–stakeholder relationship?

A Tradition of Responsibility

The issue of governmental responsibility is fundamental to the relationship which exists between the governed and the governors. This responsibility can only be realized if both political and administrative accountability within government are maintained. In Canada, as in many other parliamentary democracies, the convention of ministerial responsibility

and the practice of public service accountability define the extent to which the exercise of power is controlled and responsibility for governing is ensured.

Through the minister, the legislature and, therefore, the public are able to hold the executive of the government, that is, the Cabinet, accountable for its actions. In theory, ministers are responsible for the actions and decisions of their departments regardless of whether they were aware of them. While in the strictest sense this convention requires that ministers are answerable for the actions of their departments to the extent that they should resign if a serious error occurs, this does not happen in practice. It is generally accepted in government today that ministers cannot be held directly responsible for administrative errors of which they had no personal knowledge.¹ However, if the personal culpability of a minister is evident, the Prime Minister (or provincial Premier) may accept or request the minister's resignation.

A more applicable interpretation of ministerial responsibility suggests that ministers are answerable to Parliament for everything done within their departments to the extent that they will investigate errors, take corrective action, and report to Parliament and, therefore, to the public on the activities of their subordinates. The ability of elected officials to do so, however, is based on the permanency of public servants and the continuity of public administration.² This is particularly true when an incumbent minister

becomes answerable for the activities of a department under his or her predecessors.

Fundamental to the convention of ministerial responsibility is the belief that government must be held accountable for its actions. Moreover, since public servants exercise authority which is vested in them by elected officials, they too must be held accountable. Accountability relationships, therefore, exist between the public and elected officials and between operating departments and the public through departmental ministers. A number of accountability mechanisms, ranging from the constitution to departmental reports, formally ensure, in theory, that these accountability relationships are realized.

A combination of factors, including the growing complexity and size of government, have made it increasingly difficult to identify individuals responsible for the various activities of government. Despite the difficulties associated with enforcing accountability within government, the fundamental accountability relationships between politicians, public officials and the public have not been altered.³ The minister is still ultimately responsible for the activities of his or her department and public servants remain accountable up the chain of command to the minister.

The question is whether partnerships alter, in some practical way, the ability of the public to hold ministers and public servants responsible for their

actions. It has already been noted that identifying individuals responsible for the actions or decisions of the government has become increasingly difficult as government responsibilities have grown. Partnerships necessarily make isolating those responsible for errors more difficult as the number of people involved in the decision-making process increases.

The public sector has always been subject to strict accountability requirements. As a result, public servants and elected officials have often had very little tolerance for the assumption of risks or the outcome of mistakes. Public officials and political aides spend a great many hours ensuring that their ministers are not embarrassed by the media or an opposition which delights in an opportunity to highlight administrative errors within the government.

To the extent that partnership agreements devolve decision-making authority, therefore, they present an undeniable risk to government. Not only is power being shared with partners not traditionally accountable to the public or the government, but the exercise of authority by non-governmental partners makes administrative continuity more difficult. Partners representing non-governmental organizations are not subject to the same rules which bind public servants and the involvement of non-governmental participants in a partnership may be subject to many outside influences relating either to their respective organization or their personal commitments. The ability of

ministers to answer for the activities of non-governmental partners in an administrative environment which could be constantly changing is clearly more limited than their ability to answer for the actions of public servants.

Environment Canada defines a partnership as a legal relationship in which the partners share both profits and losses and the actions of each partner bind the others. They note that such a relationship has implications relating to the legal liability of the partners and should, therefore, only be embarked upon when it is understandable that a liability exists.⁴ Furthermore, the experimental nature of partnerships may result in hidden financial risks associated with unforeseen costs, threats to a department's credibility or image and the risk that partners may subordinate the public interest to self-interest.⁵

The devolution of power to non-governmental partners implies a corresponding devolution of responsibility for the exercise of that power.⁶ The conventions of ministerial responsibility and public service accountability within government are attempts to control the exercise of power. If partnerships do alter the power relationships between government and stakeholders, therefore, the belief that those who exercise power should be held accountable must change, or new accountability relationships must be established. Public officials cannot simply give up power and resources to non-governmental partners. Rather, they must ensure that they have the authority to do so and that there is adequate accountability for the results.⁷

Partnerships make some diffusion of accountability inevitable by virtue of the number and alliances of the players involved in decision-making. Government has to decide, therefore, how much power it is willing to share, and which accountability mechanisms it will employ to ensure that power is exercised responsibly.

The Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA) illustrates the extent to which government can devolve power in a partnership, and the accountability requirements of its doing so. The Authority itself was established by an act of the legislature outlining its mandate and the extent of its authority. A series of legally binding documents such as the Timber Management Plan and the Forest Management Undertaking further identify and clarify the roles and responsibilities of both the AFA and the OMNR. The accountability relationships of AFA staff and its board of directors are explicitly outlined within these documents. The chairperson of the Authority, while expected to cooperate fully with public officials from the OMNR, is directly answerable only to the Minister of Natural Resources. Furthermore, all activities performed or directed by the Authority must be documented in an annual report which is audited by the provincial Auditor General.

The AFA is accountable to the public not only through the Minister, but also directly through public meetings and the process of public consultation associated with the timber management planning process. The OMNR and

ultimately the Minister retain authority for ensuring that the AFA's decisions comply with the goals and policies of the government and that management of parks continues in a manner congruent with the public interest.

While the OMNR's partnership policy states that appropriate accountability frameworks must be established so that the progress of proposed partnership arrangements can be monitored,⁸ new accountability mechanisms were found to be almost totally lacking, with the exception of those associated with the AFA. None of the five remaining partnerships examined required formal reporting procedures to either the OMNR or the represented organizations or groups. Moreover, only the Magpie Co-management Committee and the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee had terms of reference or mission statements to guide their activities or outline the roles and responsibilities of the partners.

The AFA and the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site partnerships were the only arrangements supported by legal agreements of any kind. In some cases, representatives were not delegated by the various organizations but were selected and appointed directly by OMNR staff. Regardless of the method of selection of the individuals involved in the arrangements, only the March of Dimes (Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site) and the now disbanded RTIA (Magpie Co-management Committee) reported back to their respective organizations regarding the activities of the partnership. The informal nature

of many of the partnerships precluded the partners reporting back to their various constituencies.

If a trend regarding the establishment of an accountability framework can be gleaned from the six cases considered, it would appear that the extent to which formal accountability procedures were established corresponded closely with the degree of responsibility being conferred as a result of the partnership. Where formal accountability mechanisms were developed (i.e., the AFA), the government relinquished greater degrees of decision-making authority. If no accountability mechanisms were established, control of the project and/or the policy area was more closely maintained by the OMNR.

In addition, when a partnership arrangement is formalized, such as the establishment of the AFA, the government appears to be held responsible more for the nature of the agreement itself, or the process of partnering, and less for the results of the arrangement. While the government retains overall responsibility for the establishment of the policy framework within which provincial park management occurs, criticism regarding decisions which relate to the actual harvesting operations are often directed at the AFA.

According to Marcel Masse, government must inevitably continue to shed program implementation responsibilities, while assuming greater responsibilities in the areas of consultation, explanation, negotiation, persuasion and partnership.⁹ In light of government attempts to find new

ways to deliver services with scarce public funds, perhaps the move towards partnership arrangements is inevitable as they provide an avenue for reducing costs while still maintaining some degree of control. The degree of control retained by government determines the type of partnership and the accountability mechanisms which must necessarily be enforced if the responsible exercise of authority is to be ensured.

While partnerships reflect a change in the government's orientation from one of implementing and delivering programs to one of facilitating program delivery, they also necessitate a change in political culture. Governments must be prepared to accept this new role by relinquishing power and responsibility to involved stakeholders. Doing so requires both the acceptance of risks and tolerance of mistakes. Furthermore, politicians are usually geared toward making policy decisions which satisfy short-term considerations. Partnerships, on the other hand, often involve long-term ventures the results of which are neither visible nor measurable in the short-term. Establishing a partnership with the newly created AFA for the management of Algonquin Park, for example, required that provincial politicians subordinate the potential short-term economic implications resulting from the termination of eighteen Orders In Council with local forestry companies, and pursue a long-term solution to the problem of park management. Notwithstanding the immediate benefit that the partnership had

by keeping the government at arm's length from a volatile political issue, the arrangement reflects a willingness on the part of government to place significant issues in the hands of stakeholders for the achievement of long-term benefits.

Partnerships also have the obvious political benefits associated with reducing tensions between the government and stakeholders. The Magpie Co-management Committee is a prime example of how the government neutralized growing tensions among stakeholders and between stakeholders and the government. While areas of conflict remain between these groups, the partnership has provided a forum for solving these problems while displaying a commitment to broader based decision-making.

The OMNR notes that the synergistic effect of partners working together enables the achievement of objectives which would not otherwise be attainable by the individual partners.¹⁰ This synergy is evident on examination of a number of the OMNR partnership case studies. The construction and operation of the Goodyear fishway, for example, was beyond the resources of either the government, the Federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, or the Bowmanville Anglers Association. Together, however, the partners achieved something which benefitted each of the partners as well as the public in general. Partnerships which resolve problems or satisfy stakeholder demands, therefore, have obvious political benefits.

Lastly, partnership arrangements have potential implications for the role of the public official within government. The politics-administration dichotomy, once thought to prevail in government, no longer reflects accurately the role of bureaucrats in decision-making. Partnerships put additional pressure on this dichotomy as they politicize the role of bureaucrats. Public officials involved in partnership arrangements such as the Magpie Co-management Committee must, to some extent, juggle the interests of constituencies. In becoming responsible for the allocation of scarce resources, the role of public officials as administrators is more actively involved in the realm of politics.

Partnerships and Cooptation

True partnerships promote the sharing of power, responsibility and accountability between the government and stakeholders, their ultimate objective being the democratization of the decision-making process. The question posed by some theorists, however, is whether partnerships succeed in this democratization or whether they actually provide a mechanism for reducing criticism of government policy. In a presentation to department staff, then Deputy Minister of Community and Social Services, Charles Pascal, stated that there is a tendency for government to approach the various types of consultation with less than an open mind. In fact, consultation is often merely "an exercise in trying to get the public to see that we already

have the right answer."¹¹ In light of this comment, concerns that a move by government towards partnership might represent an effort to coopt stakeholders and clients should not be unexpected.

The emphasis on partnership comes at a time in the federal sphere when funding to public interest groups has been reduced. Many of these groups have traditionally relied on funding for their operations. Some theorists argue that these interest groups may instead be coopted into partnerships from which it will be difficult to criticize government policy. Furthermore, while this will be politically advantageous for government in the short-term, in the long-term, the range of interests represented and public criticism will be reduced.¹²

While it may be true that interest groups which participate in partnerships will lose some of their independence and, therefore, their objectivity in areas relating to the partnership, it is also true that partnerships allow the representatives to participate in decision-making to a greater extent than they had previously. Just as funding empowered these interests to criticize government policy from outside of the policy process, partnerships empower them by allowing them to exercise power within the decision-making process. The fact remains, however, that once stakeholders are involved in the process, it may not only become more difficult to criticize government policy, but the focus of that criticism may change from the value of the

policy itself to program delivery.

Prior to the establishment of the six partnerships under examination, a variety of relationships existed between those individuals who later became partners with the OMNR and the government. While the policy environment surrounding the issue of park management in Algonquin Park was extremely volatile and subject to intensive interest group activity, many of the individuals appointed to either AFA staff positions or its board of directors were not directly involved in the conflict. Exceptions to this were the appointments of those board members who represented various conservation and nature groups such as the Algonquin Wildlands League. In this particular case, the government generally selected as partners individuals noted for their scientific or business expertise and not for the interest which they represented.

As the Authority has evolved, the selection of board members has reflected a greater concern for issues of representation. Those individuals interviewed felt that involvement in the partnership had provided them with a greater level of understanding of both the mandates and constraints of government and that this understanding better enabled them to criticize government policy. It should be noted, however, that while representatives of the Algonquin Wildlands League recognize the advances made by the AFA, they maintain that the policy of provincial park harvesting is, in itself,

a poor policy. Moreover, representatives of this interest group currently express their opposition to provincial park policies from outside the partnership.

The majority of the partners involved in the six partnership cases shared the belief that 'knowledge is power' and that the partnerships allowed them to attack government policy from a more informed and constructive perspective. Most would not classify the nature of their relationship with government as adversarial either before or during the partnership. All partners interviewed maintained that the partnership had provided them with a greater level of understanding, both of government and the other partners. The few individuals or organizations which did admit to having a confrontational history with the OMNR prior to the partnership were concerned about the possibility of cooptation and usually resigned or withdrew from the arrangement.

Power-Sharing and the Government-Stakeholder Relationship

As stated earlier in this chapter, the overall objective of partnership arrangements is to democratize the decision-making process through consultation and collaboration with non-governmental partners. A derivative of this democratization is the empowerment of the partners. For partnership arrangements to enhance democratic governance, therefore, they must empower the partners. In addition, while there are obvious limitations to the

use of subjective evaluations, successful empowerment must enhance the partners' perceptions of their own efficacy.¹³

True partnership arrangements clearly empower the partners by sharing decision-making authority. In consultative and operational partnerships, this empowerment usually results from the ability of the partners to influence decision-making. In some cases, however, operational or consultative partnerships will evolve to allow a direct sharing of authority, or will allow sufficient discretion to the partners in their operational capacity to permit some decision-making responsibility.

In reality, however, governments have resisted innovative, risk-taking initiatives, largely due to the conventions of ministerial responsibility and public servant accountability. Furthermore, while one might expect collaborative partnerships to involve the direct sharing of power and, therefore, real empowerment, the placement of individual partnership arrangements on the power continuum introduced in chapter two, varies greatly. To determine the extent to which these arrangements actually devolve power, therefore, requires an examination of the impact of partnerships in practice.

The degree of empowerment which has resulted from the OMNR partnerships was determined by considering the partners' perceptions of empowerment, the amount of delegated or shared authority, the extent to

which decisions are made consensually and whether the government retained final decision-making authority. In all six cases overall responsibility for the policy area in question was retained by the OMNR and, ultimately, the Minister. In addition, participants in the arrangement agreed that decisions were being made more consensually as a result of the partnerships, although non-governmental partners involved in the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee disagreed regarding the extent to which this change had taken place.

Only the AFA and the Magpie Co-Management Committee illustrated actual delegated or shared authority regarding policy oriented decisions. The AFA is expected to make decisions which comply with government policy; however, their discretion in this area has grown steadily since the Authority's conception. Unlike the AFA, the Magpie Co-Management Committee was not initially intended as a collaborative partnership and was not, therefore, formally delegated any decision-making authority. Recent attempts to increase the committee's level of responsibility have resulted in the partners assuming a formal role within the timber management planning process. Nevertheless, the OMNR retains final decision-making responsibility in this area.

The AFA also displays a significant amount of authority regarding operational decisions. While the scope of the responsibility is substantially

smaller in the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site and the Goodyear Fishway partnerships, the arrangements have resulted in authority being shared for operational activities. In these cases, the OMNR acts as a 'rubber stamp' providing verbal approval for proposed activities presented to them by the partners. The Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee has no formally delegated authority for either policy or operational decisions. The committee does exercise some influence, however, over decisions which are ultimately made by the various government organizations.

The most impotent of the partnerships from the perspective of real power sharing is the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee. This committee, while intended to be collaborative in nature, possesses no decision-making authority; nor does it have any operational responsibilities. The ability of the partners to influence either government or the forestry companies is dependent on the willingness of representatives from these two sectors to cooperate.

Despite the degree of actual power-sharing which exists within the arrangements, the majority of the partners perceived that the partnership had enhanced their own efficacy and increased their level of involvement in public sector decision-making. A small number of participants in the Tupper/Shields and the Welland River partnerships maintained that while the partnership had provided them with a better understanding of the roles and

responsibilities of the other partners, it had done little to empower them or make significant changes in the decision-making process.

Empowerment can, and should, be an obvious outcome of partnership arrangements. Partners have access to planning processes which are usually not accessible. Furthermore, non-governmental partners are provided with information which enables them both to understand the decisions of government and to criticize those decisions from a more informed perspective. In the most collaborative relationships, decision-making authority and the responsibility for that authority are formally delegated or shared with the partners.

However, the extent to which real power-sharing occurs varies with the type and nature of each individual partnership. It cannot be assumed that arrangements which have been established with the intention of having public organizations become 'full' partners with non-governmental organizations actually empower the participants. Moreover, operational partnerships which are limited in scope and provide little formally delegated decision-making responsibility may devolve almost complete responsibility in a specific area, thereby significantly altering the relationship between government and its stakeholders.

Lastly, the perspective that a partnership enhances the ability of its participants to participate in decision-making is linked to the consensual

nature of decision-making and the degree to which, within a specified area, the partners are allowed to assume responsibility. Partnership arrangements with finite objectives such as the Goodyear Fishway, therefore, may yield far greater levels of satisfaction among the partners than partnerships with a broader scope but poorly defined roles and little delegated responsibility.

This chapter has considered the implications of partnership arrangements on the constitutional conventions of ministerial responsibility and public servant accountability, and on the nature of government-stakeholder relationships. It has been illustrated that partnerships do not change the fundamental accountability relationships between elected officials, public servants and the public. However, the utilization of these arrangements may potentially hinder the ability of ministers to identify clearly who is responsible for which activities within government. It is imperative, therefore, that accountability mechanisms appropriate to the level of responsibility which is being shared are instituted and enforced. Suitable accountability mechanisms have not been developed in at least three of the partnership arrangements examined.

It has also been illustrated that in most cases, partnership arrangements have successfully empowered non-governmental partners to varying degrees. Where this empowerment has occurred, the relationship between government

and its stakeholders has improved to become more cooperative and collaborative. While some non-governmental partners maintain that partnerships make objective criticism of government policy more difficult, the majority feel that the relationship has improved their ability to provide criticism by resulting in greater access to information and a better understanding of the policy-making process.

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Chapter Seven

EVALUATING PARTNERSHIP SUCCESS

Within the public sector, partnership is quickly becoming a major component in government's approach to problem solving. Partnerships provide a mechanism for increasing the efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness of public organizations while engaging the public in the process of priority setting, policy development and program delivery. Because these arrangements have assumed such a high profile position among the battery of management initiatives which may be pursued, it is important that they be evaluated to determine their effectiveness, not only as a problem-solving tool but also as an integral part of public management.

This chapter will provide criteria for measuring, and an assessment of, the overall success of six OMNR partnership cases. Following this, various characteristics which are associated with the positive outcome of partnership arrangements will be outlined. Four of these characteristics, referred to as success factors, will be evaluated to determine their impact on the outcome of the six OMNR partnerships.

The last part of this chapter will examine some of the limitations on partnership development within the public sector, with specific reference to those values which guide the exercise of public business.

Partnership Evaluation

It is difficult to assess the long-term value of partnership arrangements due to their relatively recent appearance in the public sector. However, most theorists agree that regular evaluations are necessary to maintain a partnership successfully once the momentum which originally resulted in its establishment diminishes.

Among the criteria which can be used to evaluate partnership performance are effectiveness and efficiency. Effectiveness, for example, can be measured as the ability of the partnership to satisfy the expectations of the partners, or its success in meeting its stated objectives. Cost-benefit analysis may be used to evaluate the degree of efficiency of a particular partnership arrangement. Other criteria for evaluation might include the continued commitment and participation of the partners, the ability of the partnership to adapt to a changing environment and the extent to which the government-stakeholder relationship has been altered. It is notable that the only OMNR partnership for which an evaluation mechanism was developed was the Algonquin Forestry Authority.

For the purpose of this thesis, partnership success will be evaluated against the following criteria: a) the ability of the partnership to satisfy generic objectives associated with partnership arrangements, b) the effectiveness of the partnership, and c) the extent to which the partnership

meets the expectations of the partners. A determination of the efficiency of a particular arrangement was felt to be outside of the scope of this thesis.

As illustrated earlier in the thesis, the generic objective of partnership arrangements is the democratization of decision-making. This can be achieved by increasing the level of public participation in decision-making and, ultimately, by empowering non-governmental partners. Empowerment has both an objective and a subjective component. In chapter six, the degree to which partnerships actually empowered the participants was determined by assessing the amount of delegated or shared authority, the nature of decision-making, and the subjective perception by the partners that their self-efficacy had been enhanced as a result of the partnership. If the OMNR partnerships resulted in an increase in public participation in decision-making or the empowerment of the partners, therefore, they are determined to have satisfied the generic objective of partnerships.

Individual partnership arrangements are intended not only as a means of empowering the partners, but also of meeting specific needs and satisfying goals and objectives which are shared among the partners. A measure of the effectiveness of partnerships, therefore, is the ability of the arrangement to meet the stated objectives of the partnership, regardless of whether those objectives are short-term and project-oriented, or long-term and broadly based.

Secondly, effective partnerships must be capable of evolving to reflect changes within the policy environment. This evolution may substantially change the goals and objectives of the arrangement or the nature of the partnership itself. This is the case in partnership arrangements which evolve to become more collaborative as greater levels of responsibility are assumed by the partners.

The third criterion for assessing the success of partnership arrangements provides a subjective element to the evaluation. Partnerships cannot be considered entirely successful if they do not meet the expectations of the participants. The degree to which these expectations have been met is expressed both in the opinions of the partners and in their continuing participation in the partnership arrangement.

The **Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site** partnership was intended to solve a myriad of problems, the most important of which were the need to satisfy the interests of the public, to reduce the financial burden of maintaining the site and to ensure the acceptance of necessary changes by stakeholders. By soliciting direct public input and demonstrating its commitment to the public participation process, the OMNR ensured a high degree of public ownership of the solution and promoted a better understanding of public needs. Furthermore, the financial objectives of the partnership have been exceeded as maintenance and operational costs have been dramatically reduced since

the partnership's conception.

The bulk of the decision-making authority associated with this site has remained with the government. However, within the scope of the operational responsibilities which the March of Dimes has assumed, they exercise an increasing amount of discretion. Moreover, the extent to which the public determined the outcome of the site by responding to the survey distributed by the District, enabled them to become true 'partners' in the planning stage of the partnership. This participation in planning and the responsibility for site operation have satisfied the expectations of the partners and have empowered them, albeit in a limited area. Clearly, the Trout Lake Waste Disposal partnership can be considered a success on the basis of the three assessment criteria being considered. The OMNR dramatically reduced its financial burden while empowering the stakeholders and, in doing so, created a model facility which is being duplicated at other locations both inside and outside the Thunder Bay District.

The second operational partnership, namely the **Goodyear Fishway**, is also considered a successful partnership. The OMNR faced growing public displeasure, as well as fiscal and human resource restrictions which limited its ability to deal with the problem present in the Bowmanville Creek. In this particular case, the impetus for the arrangement came from the BCAA; however, the OMNR displayed a commitment to cooperative management in

its acceptance and support of the proposal as well as in its financial contribution to the project.

While the OMNR retains final decision-making authority for the facility, the BCAA is given substantial discretion in deciding when the fishway will operate. In addition, the fact that the BCAA was almost entirely responsible for soliciting funds for the project, and was involved in the fishways construction, has resulted in a sense of ownership of the facility and participation in government program development. The partnership has provided both the OMNR and the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans with a facility they could otherwise not afford, and has satisfied public demands for improved recreational opportunities.

The **Magpie Forest** conflict presented the government with a different set of problems than the preceding operational partnerships. The majority of these problems revolved around the issues of communication, participation, and responsiveness. The OMNR initially attempted to resolve the conflicts within the confines of existing procedures, such as the timber management planning amendment process. However, these procedures did not allow for adequate participation by fragmented and seasonal stakeholders such as the remote tourism operators. Years of conflict resulted in a general mistrust by the tourism operators not only of the other groups but also of the OMNR, which was perceived as conducting unbalanced planning which neither

responded to client needs nor truly encouraged stakeholder participation.

The OMNR responded to this situation by establishing a consultative partnership in which the Magpie Forest Co-management Committee also assumed some operational responsibilities. While the government retains decision-making authority for all resource management decisions within the Magpie Forest, the consensual nature of the committee's recommendations make any attempts by the OMNR to disregard the recommendations difficult. As a result, the partners have become a vital part of the policy-making process. Furthermore, as the committee members have become more experienced in dealing with resource management issues, their role has evolved to become a more formal part of timber management planning.

Participants in the Magpie Co-management Committee have assumed ownership of the problems within the forest as well as their solutions. In doing so, most of the partners have accepted personal responsibility for the operational projects undertaken by the committee and have derived a great deal of satisfaction from their completion. With the exception of two of the original committee members, all of the partners continue to participate in the partnership on a regular basis and express a willingness to assume greater levels of responsibility.

One of the few problems associated with this partnership relates to the expiration of OMNR funding for the Remote Tourist Industry Association

(RTIA) and the tourism coordinator. While discussions regarding the reestablishment of this association are ongoing, no decisions have been made either by the OMNR or by representatives of the industry. If the interests of this industry are to be recognized, accommodations must be made to assist them in remaining organized. Nevertheless, this partnership is clearly an example of successful collaboration between the government and its stakeholders.

The **Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee** represents a proactive attempt by the government to establish a government-stakeholder partnership. Established by the Ministry of the Environment, this partnership attempts to address a significant environmental problem, namely the contamination of the Welland River and specifically the Atlas reef, through a process of consultation and partnership with both governmental and non-governmental partners.

The arrangement has provided the cleanup project with a degree of coordination and cooperation not often present in projects which cross departmental boundaries. In addition, by providing a forum for public input into the planning, the committee does, in theory, provide greater levels of public participation in the process. One of the problems associated with this participation, however, is the degree of access provided to the public. Members of the public were not invited to participate in the committee. Rather, individuals were hand-picked and personally approached by Acres

and the MOE. Furthermore, these individuals did not formally represent any specific interests, nor did they have any forum for communicating their involvement in the planning process to the public.

Nevertheless, the individuals involved in the committee are able to exercise some influence over the recommendations being made and can participate in the planning of the project to a greater extent than before. Much of this influence results from the presense of representatives from the various public agencies which exercise direct control over the cleanup project and their willingness to seek solutions which satisfy the interests of the majority, if not all, of the partners.

All of the original partners continue to be involved in this arrangement, and while the majority express satisfaction with the progress achieved, a number of partners maintain that this progress has been slow and is limited by the reluctance of the MOE to enforce regulations relating to the remediation of contaminated waterways. In fact, the partnership was initially intended as an ad hoc committee which would plan and oversee the remediation of the Atlas reef only. The scope of the committee's mandate has evolved, therefore, to reflect the changing nature of the problem. Their progress cannot proceed further, however, without either funding from some, or all, of the partners, or formally delegated authority which would enable the committee to direct the actual cleanup of the river.

An assessment of this particular partnership indicates that the arrangement has experienced limited success in meeting its objectives or satisfying the generic objectives of partnership agreements. The assessment of the committee's success by the partners is slightly more positive, but remains limited.

Of the six OMNR partnership arrangements studied, the **Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee** has been the least successful. This partnership was established to resolve both a short-term conflict and the longer-term objective of co-managing the natural resources within the Tupper/Shields area. The short-term conflict revolved around the development of an access road into an area with substantial tourism and recreational value. The long-term issue, however, focuses on the land use planning decisions outlined in the District Land Use Guideline (DLUG).

Herein lies the basis for one of the major problems associated with this particular partnership. The committee deals with the issues surrounding resource management in the Tupper/Shields area within the scope of the timber management planning process. This process presumes the acceptance of the guidelines for land use planning which are provided in the DLUG. Many of the partners, however, rejected these guidelines as well as the basic assumption that forest harvesting should continue in an area with such significant recreational value.

Despite the philosophical differences between the partners, the committee may have been able to approach the issue of forest management in a manner which satisfied the stakeholders, had the goals and objectives of the partnership been clearly defined and had they reflected the interests of all the partners. As the terms of reference establishing the partnership were not satisfactory to all the partners, the foundation was laid for continued conflict between the partners.

The committee enjoys no formal authority or responsibility for planning or decision-making regarding the management area despite the fact that the terms of reference identify the committee as a **full partner** to the OMNR. Meetings are not conducted based on any rules of order, and while consensus is sought, it is seldom achieved. The influence which dissenting partners do possess is entirely dependent on the goodwill of either the OMNR or representatives of the forest industry.

To the extent that industry and government have been willing to listen and to compromise, we can consider that the remaining stakeholders have been empowered. However, this empowerment has been limited and remains very tenuous in that no formal basis for this stakeholder empowerment exists. In addition, none of the non-governmental partners perceive this arrangement as altering, in any substantial way, their own efficacy in the decision-making process; nor do they feel the partnership provides a balanced reflection of the

stakeholder interests. Lastly, in the face of growing dissension regarding the partnership, the OMNR has resisted efforts to alter the committee's mandate, format or authority.

The **Algonquin Forestry Authority (AFA)** is a final example of a partnership which has met both the generic objectives associated with partnership arrangements and the specific objectives for which it was established. The Authority was intended to address a number of concerns, including satisfying the demands by lobby groups for greater involvement in the management of Algonquin Park and managing the Park in a manner which was both financially and environmentally sound. Furthermore, the government had to find a solution which would alleviate a number of administrative problems, coordinate the management of the park, and provide some distance between the OMNR and the contentious issues surrounding park management while still maintaining some degree of control.

While the government retains final decision-making authority regarding provincial park management in general, and management within Algonquin Park specifically, the AFA possesses a significant amount of responsibility and decision-making authority. Moreover, this authority has expanded as the partnership has progressed and increasing operational responsibilities have been delegated to the AFA by the OMNR. The resistance of OMNR field level staff and of some senior managers to the expanding role of the AFA

bears witness to the degree of real power-sharing which has resulted from this partnership.

Stakeholders who at one time lobbied the government regarding management of the Park from outside the policy making process, now have formally delegated authority and are able to exercise that authority from within the process. As a result, the level of satisfaction expressed by the partners is extremely high, although some dissatisfaction exists among the more vocal lobbyists who were originally involved with the AFA. Only one stakeholder organization, namely the Algonquin Wildlands League, has chosen to remove itself from direct involvement in the AFA. In addition, general levels of public concern regarding the management of the Park have been substantially reduced.

All of the administrative problems associated with conflicting physical boundaries and multiple forest operators have been eliminated as a result of the partnership. The actual management of the Park has been lauded as an "environmental model" by a number of organizations, including the Algonquin Wildlands League. Lastly, the OMNR, while no longer directly involved in forest harvesting within the Park, maintains sufficient control of its management to ensure that the public interest continues to be served.

An evaluation of the success of the six OMNR partnership cases reveals that four of the partnerships have been extremely successful in meeting their

objectives and empowering their stakeholders. The extent of this empowerment has varied, however, depending on the type of partnership and the scope of its responsibilities. The Welland River Cleanup Project partnership has had more limited success in this area, but remains a viable partnership which requires some modifications in its mandate and authority to continue successfully.

In terms of the three criteria used in this thesis, the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee cannot be considered an example of a successful partnership. Nevertheless, this arrangement reflects an attempt by the government to incorporate the interests of stakeholders into the decision-making process. The problems associated with this particular arrangement revolve primarily around its original concept and the selection of the participants themselves although a number of other difficulties, including a lack of commitment and formalization, are evident.

Partnership Success Factors

In light of the recent nature of partnership arrangements in the public sector and the lack of comprehensive studies of these initiatives, it is difficult to prescribe those conditions which are critical to successful partnership. Nevertheless, there are a number of factors which theorists and practitioners of public management suggest contribute to a partnership's success. Loreto states that the primary requirements for successful partnership include a good

concept, commitment, and champions. Kanter, on the other hand, provides several success attributes which focus on the concepts of commitment, power-equality and formalization of the partnership.¹

Many factors contribute to the success or failure of a partnership arrangement. Furthermore, the significance of these factors changes according to the type of partnership being established. For example, it has been suggested that the equality of the partners is fundamental to successful partnership. However, this factor is much more salient in collaborative partnerships in which real power-sharing and the devolution of authority occur than in arrangements in which a non-governmental partner assumes limited responsibility for a specific program or project.

The four success factors being considered in this thesis include: i) an equitable balance of power, ii) commitment, iii) limited objectives, and iv) formalization. It has been suggested that an **equitable power structure**, based on the interdependence of the partners, would enable all the partners to influence decisions, thereby ensuring an effective and enduring partnership.² In many cases, however, the government remains dominant in the partnership by virtue of its legal authority or resources. In these cases, it is necessary that there be a recognition of those resources which the other partners bring to the partnership. These values might include expertise, capital, public influence, or credibility. Equity is illustrated by such factors

as the articulation of the partners' interests within the objectives of the partnership, and the power that each partner brings to the table or exercises within the partnership.

Partnerships cannot be entirely successful if they do not have the support and **commitment** of all the partners. This commitment is based on the shared values and goals which form the foundation of the agreement. Partners must feel that the partnership is **theirs** and that they can influence its evolution. Commitment must also be reflected in tangible ways such as the provision of financial and/or human resources,³ as well as a willingness to modify policy or program delivery in accordance with the recommendations of the partnership.

Partnerships which exhibit a **narrow scope and limited objectives** are presumed to be easier to establish and maintain successfully than those which are more broadly focused. It is suggested that these partnerships require fewer partners and resources and have results which are more visible and easily measurable.⁴ These partnerships also tend to be shorter in duration due to the limited nature of their objectives.

The last success factor being considered, **formalization**, implies that the more formalized a partnership is, the greater the likelihood that it will be successfully maintained. Partnerships can be formalized in a variety of ways, including legal agreements or terms of reference, clearly defined roles and

responsibilities and corresponding accountability relationships, and organizational structures such as committees. This formalization helps to maintain partnerships which are inherently fragile in nature.⁵

An equitable power structure is clearly evident in only one of the partnerships examined, namely the Algonquin Forestry Authority. Four of the remaining partnership arrangements illustrate power structures which are unequal due to the retention of decision-making authority by the government and the often unorganized nature of the non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, these partnerships reflect an acknowledgement by the majority of the partners of the other partners' contributions and display an attempt by the dominant partner not to exercise control over the partnership. In addition, the objectives of these arrangements reflect the interests of all the partners. The Tupper/Shields partnership is the only arrangement in which significant power inequities exist. This appears to be largely a result of a lack of delegated representation and the inability of many of the partners to influence either the public or the other partners. Furthermore, this inequity is reflected in the terms of reference for the committee, which do not adequately represent the interests of all the partners.

Formalization appears to play a more significant role in partnerships in which greater levels of power-sharing occur. The Trout Lake, Magpie Forest and AFA partnerships all exhibited a high degree of formalization and

involve real power-sharing within the scope of the partnership. Both the Trout Lake and the AFA partnerships are defined by legal agreements. Clearly the AFA is the most formalized of the six partnership arrangements, having been established by an act of the legislature and having clearly defined roles, responsibilities and accountability relationships outlined in various legal or policy documents. The Magpie Forest Co-management Committee is formalized by explicit terms of reference in which the committee's goals and objectives, as well as the roles and responsibilities of the partners, are established. In addition, the committee structure itself further formalizes this partnership as do the procedures followed during committee meetings and its inclusion in the terms of reference for the new TMP.

The remaining three partnerships are more informal in nature, having no clearly defined guidelines. The Goodyear Fishway, in particular, is based on an informal oral agreement between OMNR staff and representatives of the Bowmanville Anglers Association. This particular partnership, however, also exhibits a very narrow scope and is oriented towards a single, short-term project.

High levels of commitment, on the part of all the partners, are evident in all the partnerships, with the exception of the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee. In each of the five successful partnerships,

government has illustrated its commitment to the arrangement by its willingness to act on the recommendations which result from the partnerships. Furthermore, all of the partners have committed either human or financial resources to the partnerships and the majority express satisfaction with, and ownership of, the outcome of the partnerships. The Tupper/Shields partnership does not reflect the same degree of commitment by the partners, especially those partners not representing either government or industry.

Examination of the six partnerships indicates that narrow objectives do, in fact, make easier the task of establishing a partnership. The Trout Lake, Goodyear Fishway and Welland River partnerships had relatively narrow objectives and presented few problems in determining which stakeholders should be involved and the scope of the arrangements. The remaining partnerships had goals and objectives which were far broader, and perhaps longer term in nature. As a result, establishing the partnerships required more care to ensure that all significant stakeholders were represented and their roles and responsibilities clearly outlined. As discussed earlier, the effort required to establish the Tupper/Shields partnership did not ensure either clearly defined roles and responsibilities or the partnership's success.

It is unclear, however, whether narrow objectives result in partnerships which are more likely to be successful and which are easier to maintain once established. The Magpie Forest and the AFA partnerships are both broadly

focused and reflect mandates in which substantial responsibility is conferred on the partners. These two partnerships have clearly been successful in achieving their objectives and do not appear to be in any jeopardy. While it may be more difficult initially to satisfy broad objectives such as those addressed in the Magpie and AFA partnerships, once a partnership has been established successfully, long term maintenance of these arrangements may be no more difficult than maintaining partnerships with limited objectives. The conclusion may be drawn that the formality of the partnership, the accountability framework and the ability of a partnership to evolve in response to a changing environment are perhaps more salient when addressing partnership maintenance.

Limitations to Public Sector Partnerships

The popularity of partnerships as a strategic management tool is undeniable in both the public and the private sectors. However, the environment within which public administrators must function is drastically different than that of their counterparts in the private sector. The question we must address is whether there are factors which limit the implementation of partnership arrangements within the public sector.

The management of government is subject to a variety of rules and regulations which do not typically apply to private sector organizations. These rules result from the fact that public organizations in Canada are part

of a democratic political system. Public managers, therefore, must operate in a complex world of political, managerial and ethical values.⁶

In considering the establishment of a partnership arrangement, the public servant must be cognizant of those values which define public sector management. Partnerships offer the flexibility that is sometimes needed to deal with complex issues such as the environment, but the scope of innovation must be limited to some degree by the nature of public business. The impact which a partnership may have on the maintenance of values such as consistency, fairness, prudence, and probity may limit the degree to which government is willing to share authority.

Furthermore, the political framework within which public business occurs will determine the extent to which government is willing to assume the risks which are associated with partnership agreements. Politicians may be unwilling to accept the potential for credibility problems should they become partners with unacceptable organizations, or for the political backlash associated with a partnership which has 'gone wrong'. Issues such as a loss of political control, the possible subordination of the public interest, legal liability and conflict of interest must be considered prior to establishing a partnership within the public sector.

The possibility that partnerships may complicate bureaucratic and political accountability was discussed in chapter six. The public's need to hold

government responsible for its actions must certainly limit the empowerment potential of public sector partnerships. For example, the OMNR is still responsible for all operations at the Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site and must ensure, therefore, that the March of Dimes complies with Ministry of the Environment regulations. This responsibility restricts the degree to which the OMNR will be willing to devolve decision-making authority for the site. Governments must decide how far a public sector partnership can and should go towards real power-sharing and what types of accountability mechanisms should be instituted to ensure that accountability for public business continues.

Public sector partnerships may also be limited by public expectations regarding the role of government. Partnerships can be viewed by the public as either promoting external empowerment or as a means of offloading government responsibilities.⁷ Government will be less likely to enter into partnership arrangements or to become involved in real power-sharing if these arrangements are perceived negatively.

This chapter has considered the issue of partnership success and the limitations to this success within the public sector. An examination of the six OMNR partnership cases reveals that the only partnership which can be considered to have failed to meet both its own objectives and the generic

objectives associated with partnership arrangements was the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee. The Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee has had limited success while the remaining four partnerships have been very successfully established and maintained.

An examination of four attributes which have been considered necessary to successful partnership illustrated that an equitable power structure, the commitment of all the partners and the formalization of the partnership play a significant role in determining the outcome of an arrangement. The impact of limited objectives on partnership outcome was unclear.

The final section of this chapter outlined a number of potential limitations to successful partnership within the public sector. These limitations include the political, managerial and ethical environment within which government must function. In addition, public sector partnership may be limited by the unwillingness of elected officials to devolve power and responsibility or to assume the risks associated with partnership arrangements. Issues such as the ability of the public to hold government accountable for its actions and public expectations regarding the role of government may also limit the participation of the government in this type of management initiative.

E N D N O T E S

1. For a variety of proposed success factors refer to: Consulting and Audit Canada, Partnerships, Devolution and Power Sharing: Issues and Implication for Management, (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services, 1993), Annex B; Kanter, Rosabeth Moss, When Giants Learn To Dance, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), pp.172-174; Kernaghan, Kenneth, "Partnership and Public Administration: Conceptual and Practical Considerations", Canadian Public Administration, Vol.36, No.1, pp.73-75; and success factors identified by R. Loreto in Ministry of Education and Training, Partnership Case Studies, (Toronto: 1993), pp.24-26.
2. Kernaghan, Op.Cit., p.74.
3. Ministry of Education and Training, Op.Cit. pp.24-25.
4. Kernaghan, Op.Cit., p.75.
5. Ibid.
6. Denhardt, Robert B., The Pursuit of Significance: Strategies for Managerial Success in Public Organizations, (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), p.257.
7. Consulting and Audit Canada, Op.Cit., pp.6-7.

Chapter Eight**CONCLUSIONS**

Efforts to reform the public sector are not confined to Canada. Rather, these efforts have become a priority in many governments around the world, reflecting common themes which have surfaced within the political, social and economic environments of their respective communities. Paramount among these themes is the increasing desire of the public for more consensual decision-making, frustration with government and its programs, the impact of new technology and scarce public resources. The result of these forces has been an emphasis within government on providing better quality public service with fewer resources.

Partnerships have provided government with an opportunity to address the complex problems it faces by changing its role to reflect the new realities of governance rather than expanding its responsibilities. This thesis has explored partnership arrangements to determine both their value in the public sector and their potential impact on government. Specifically, six partnership arrangements involving the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources have been examined, with observations being applied to the general use of partnership by, or involving, government.

This concluding chapter will provide a summary of the data and

arguments presented in the preceding chapters and will relate this material to the six hypotheses outlined in chapter one. The final section of this chapter will present a number of recommendations which may be useful in the establishment and maintenance of these agreements.

SUMMARY AND GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

An introduction to the concept and practice of partnership and an overview of attempts at public sector reform were presented in chapter one. An outline of the thesis, its intent and research methodology and a summary of the content of the remaining chapters was provided. Six hypotheses relating to the overall success of partnership arrangements, their political implications and potential success factors guided the development of the thesis.

Chapter two elaborated on the subject of partnership by providing a working definition of the concept as well as definitions of partnership types and their associated criteria. The term **partnership** has often been used loosely and incorrectly to describe arrangements which involve neither power-sharing nor a genuine attempt by government to increase public participation in decision-making. Partnerships were defined in this thesis as relationships involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or information for the achievement of joint goals and/or compatible benefits.

Because partnership arrangements must be tailored to suit specific circumstances, it is inherently difficult to classify them according to preestablished criteria. Nevertheless, partnership categories provide a framework within which comparisons and an assessment of success can be made. The four partnership categories presented in this thesis are based on the partnership's purpose and the nature and extent of power exercised by the partners. These categories include collaborative, consultative, operational, and contributory partnerships, each category involving less power-sharing than the preceding category. The analysis of OMNR partnerships does not include examples of contributory partnerships, as these arrangements involve no operational or decision-making responsibilities and are least likely to alter the power-sharing relationship between government and stakeholders. It was noted that specific partnerships may satisfy criteria associated with more than one category or may evolve from one category to another as the partnership progresses.

Another approach to partnership classification introduced within the thesis considers a partnership continuum on which placement of a particular arrangement would depend on criteria such as the extent of power being shared by the partners or, conversely, being retained by government. While this approach was not utilized when evaluating the six OMNR partnerships, it was illustrated that a partnership continuum of this nature would

compensate for variations in delegated power which may exist within one category type.

It was demonstrated that partnerships have assumed a high profile position among innovations both at the federal and the provincial levels of government. Within Ontario specifically, partnerships have become a part of the provincial strategy for increasing public participation in policy-making. Public officials within the various provincial ministries are being innundated with the language of partnership during professional development training, seminars and committee discussions. The popularity of partnership is reflected in the growing number of staff assigned to partnership development positions and committees such as the Inter-ministerial Partnership Network. Nevertheless, the fragility of these relationships necessitates a thorough evaluation to determine their applicability in the public sector.

The OMNR has included partnership development in its policy and strategy document for the 1990's. While this ministry has been involved in "working relationships" for years, the current emphasis appears to reflect a more consensual, less paternal philosophy regarding resource policy development. The Ministry has clearly displayed commitment to a proactive philosophy by establishing a partnership task force and developing a policy framework within which partnerships should be established. However, it was demonstrated that while the OMNR has illustrated its commitment to the

partnership philosophy, it has fallen behind in its implementation. The many partnership arrangements which exist across the province are largely the result of initiatives by field level staff faced with resource constraints or significant management problems. Furthermore, while the partnership policy framework was intended to provide guidelines and 'best practices' to Ministry staff establishing such an arrangement, most staff associated with the six cases were unaware of the document or its contents. For this reason, many of the partnerships established are lacking attributes such as accountability mechanisms which were considered vitally important by the partnership task force.

District staff exhibited a poor understanding of what constitutes a partnership involving real power-sharing. In addition, the OMNR has not dealt with the overriding question, "How far should power-sharing go?". In deferring the resolution of this issue, they have perhaps limited their ability to exploit fully the benefits of partnership.

Operational and consultative partnerships are by far the most predominant types with the OMNR despite its declaration that it intends to pursue partnerships in which more than just work is shared. Collaborative arrangements are extremely scarce and many partnerships which District staff felt were collaborative in nature better represented examples of consultative partnership. Contributory partnerships are fairly new to the OMNR and

represent a small proportion of their overall partnership arrangements.

As a general rule, collaborative partnerships were established with fewer partners than consultative partnerships. Operational arrangements exhibited no clear trend regarding the number of partners. This type of arrangement tended to have very specific, project-oriented objectives which were sometimes shorter in duration than either consultative or collaborative partnerships. Furthermore, these arrangements usually provided for easily measurable results.

To examine, in greater detail, how successfully the OMNR has achieved its objectives regarding power-sharing and public participation, two partnerships representing each of the three main partnership categories were evaluated as follows:

<u>Partnership</u>	<u>Type</u>
Algonquin Forestry Authority	Collaborative
Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee	Collaborative
Magpie Co-management Committee	Consultative
Welland River Cleanup Project Planning Committee	Consultative
Trout Lake Waste Disposal Site	Operational
Goodyear Fishway	Operational

Descriptive analysis regarding each of the cases was provided in chapters three, four and five. The partnerships were then evaluated on the basis of various criteria to determine their impact on the government-stakeholder relationship and the degree of success achieved, and to test the hypotheses

outlined in chapter one. Each of these hypotheses is examined in the following pages.

While partnership agreements blur the practice of accountability, they do not alter the formal accountability relationships in government today.

In general, it was demonstrated that partnership arrangements do not, in themselves, alter the fundamental accountability relationships that exist between politicians, public officials and the public. Ministers are still responsible for the activities of their departments and the decisions of their subordinates. Moreover, public servants remain accountable to their superiors and, ultimately, to their Minister.

Despite the constitutional convention of ministerial responsibility, current practice dictates that ministers not be held personally responsible, to the extent that they resign, for errors occurring within their departments of which they had no personal knowledge. The implementation of partnerships by public officials, therefore, will not result in greater ministerial resignations unless the personal culpability of a minister can be associated with an administrative error resulting from the partnerships.

However, ministers are considered to be responsible for the activities of their departments to the extent that they investigate errors, take corrective action and report to Parliament or the legislature regarding the actions of their

subordinates. It was concluded that partnerships do limit, in a number of ways, the ability of ministers to answer for their departments. Clearly, any delegation of decision-making authority to individuals outside the public service must result in logistical difficulties when attempting to identify those responsible for errors. Furthermore, the involvement of people outside the government makes administrative continuity difficult. A minister's ability to answer for the activities of his or her subordinates depends on this continuity. It is imperative, therefore, that accountability mechanisms be established to counteract the impact of partnership on the practical application of political and bureaucratic accountability.

Accountability mechanisms were successfully implemented in the establishment of the Algonquin Forestry Authority. However, appropriate mechanisms were not evident in the remaining five partnership cases. It is assumed that the development of accountability mechanisms in the AFA partnership reflects the substantially greater degree of authority which was delegated to that partnership.

It was also demonstrated that there are a number of other political implications associated with partnership development which must be addressed by elected officials and public servants. Issues such as loss of political control, the possible subordination of the public interest, legal liability for the outcome of the partnership and conflict of interest are but a

few. Positive implications included the political benefits of reduced tensions between government and stakeholders and the synergistic effect of combined resources evidenced by the establishment of the Magpie Forest and Trout Lake partnerships.

Analysis of the six OMNR partnerships also indicates that these arrangements contribute to the politicization of bureaucrats. Public officials involved in these partnerships have the difficult task of juggling the partners' interests. In doing so, they assume authoritative responsibility for allocating scarce resources.

Partnerships can make criticism of government policy difficult by making government critics a 'part of the process.'

An examination of the the impact of the partnerships on the ability of non-governmental partners to criticize government policy demonstrated that while interest groups may lose some of their independence when involved in partnerships, they also enjoy greater levels of participation in decision-making. The majority of the partners felt that their involvement in the partnership provided them with greater access to information and better opportunities to influence public sector management. In addition, most felt that 'knowledge is power', and this knowledge is only available by virtue of their involvement inside the policy-making process. Furthermore, the majority of the partners who had previously criticised government policy

continued to do so, although the nature of that criticism was less adversarial.

Public sector partnerships which result in real power-sharing are infrequent and usually develop in an environment subject to political pressure and/or intensive interest group activity.

All of the partnerships, with the exception of the Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee, successfully empowered the participants, although to varying degrees. The only partnership in which decision-making authority was formally delegated to the partnership was the Algonquin Forestry Authority. The social and political environment within which this partnership was established exhibited, by far, the most intensive lobbying by interest groups, and high levels of public awareness as illustrated by the CBC television special highlighting Algonquin Park. As a result of this lobbying and public interest, the Minister of Natural Resources and the provincial Premier experienced significant pressure to resolve the situation.

In all cases, overall responsibility for the policy area has remained with the government and, ultimately, the Minister. However, decisions are being made more consensually, and the participants perceive their involvement and their ability to influence policy in a positive light. Where partnerships have progressed successfully, such as in the case of the Magpie Forest Co-management Committee, the government has exhibited a willingness to devolve greater levels of authority and to permit more power-sharing.

Partnership agreements can work if they are developed with care and commitment.

It was demonstrated that five of the six partnerships successfully satisfied both the generic objectives associated with partnership and the specific goals and objectives for which the partnership was established. In addition, these partnerships have met the expectations of the majority of the partners. The Trout Lake, Magpie Forest and Algonquin Forestry Authority partnerships are particularly successful. Each of these partnerships has evolved as the arrangement has progressed to provide greater levels of power-sharing and/or a greater degree of formalization for the partnership itself.

The Trout Lake, Magpie Forest and Algonquin Forestry Authority partnerships were also established with the greatest care, utilizing legal supporting documents where applicable. In both the Magpie Forest and the Algonquin Forestry Authority partnerships, significant attention was given to the selection of the participants to ensure that all major stakeholders were represented and that the appropriate mix of human resources was provided. It is interesting to note that these three partnerships represent each of the three partnership categories, indicating that partnership success depends less on the type of partnership and more on its establishment and implementation.

The Tupper/Shields Cooperative Management Committee, however, was found to be lacking in a variety of ways, especially in the ability of the

partners to compromise in the achievement of their objectives. Furthermore, this partnership illustrates the dangers associated with inadequate planning during the establishment of the partnership. The result has been a partnership based on principles and objectives which are not acceptable to all the participants, and a relationship among the partners which, at best, is adversarial.

The care which should be taken when establishing a partnership arrangement must also be present for the duration of the arrangement. The fragility of these alliances necessitates nurturing and on-going evaluation to facilitate their evolution as the environment within which they function changes.

Partnerships which have been developed with a fairly equitable balance of power and/or a high level of commitment by all the partners are more likely to succeed.

It was acknowledged that many factors contribute to the success or failure of a partnership, and that the significance of these factors varies depending on the type of partnership endeavor. Nevertheless, an examination of the six partnership cases illustrated that an equitable balance of power or the accommodation of a power imbalance was present in all five successful partnerships. Where an imbalance occurs, the partners exhibit an appreciation of the contributions of the weaker partners, and do not exercise control over

the partnership. The dominant partner can modify this imbalance by occupying a single seat and a corresponding single vote on committees, ensuring that their resources are shared with the remaining partners and that partnership objectives reflect the interests of all the partners.

Furthermore, it was concluded that the commitment of all the partners plays a significant role in determining a partnership's outcome. In each of the five successful partnerships, both the government and the non-governmental partners exhibited high levels of commitment to the partnership as well as its objectives. This commitment was evidenced by such factors as the willingness of the government to accept recommendations or decisions resulting from the arrangement, the commitment of human or financial resources, and the continued participation of the partners.

Partnerships with fairly narrow objectives and which have been formalized in some way are more likely to succeed.

It was demonstrated that partnerships in which greater levels of power-sharing occur also tend to be more formal in structure and, occasionally, are defined by legal documentation or legislation. The Algonquin Forestry Authority, for example, was established by legislation and its responsibilities outlined within a number of legal documents. Formalization does not appear to affect the outcome of arrangements such as the Goodyear Fishway, in

which the goals are project oriented and very specific and the number of partners involved is limited. While it was unclear whether narrow objectives result in partnerships which are more likely to succeed, it was illustrated that this success factor did result in partnerships which were easier to establish.

Finally, it was illustrated that the ability of the government to enter into, and enjoy the benefits of, partnership arrangements is limited by the very nature of public business. Values such as consistency, fairness, prudence and probity define the exercise of authority by public servants. However, the characteristics of partnership may not always be compatible with these values. Moreover, the political implications of power-sharing and the impact which partnerships may have on the practical application of political and bureaucratic accountability may restrict the degree to which real power-sharing can occur.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations have been developed to assist government in establishing and maintaining successful partnerships. These recommendations apply to partnership policy within a government organization as well as the planning and establishment of such arrangements. It is not intended that they be considered a comprehensive summary of all issues which should be considered when entering into partnership.

Government organizations should develop a policy framework within

which partnership development can occur. The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources has developed such a framework in the form of the partnership policy statement developed by the Partnerships Taskforce. However, this document should include recommended accountability mechanisms and evaluation procedures, which could be utilized by staff entering into a partnership agreement. Furthermore, the issue of how far a public sector partnership can and should go towards real power-sharing must be addressed so that guidelines and boundaries can be established and applied to new partnerships.

Governments must also ensure that public servants are familiar with the policy direction provided within this framework. Appropriate human resource training should be provided to the extent that management staff have a clear understanding of the intent and purpose of partnership, procedures for their establishment, and requirements for success. Skills such as the ability of managers to communicate effectively and to pursue innovative management techniques should be recognized and valued.

When planning a partnership, consideration must be given to its legal, financial and administrative implications as well as the potential political risks associated with the sharing of power. Furthermore, public servants considering such arrangements should ensure that the foundation for the agreement itself is valid. A faulty concept which does not adequately address

the concerns or issues at hand will not succeed in meeting its objectives or satisfying the expectations of the partners.

When selecting the partners, consideration should be given to their willingness and ability to communicate, cooperate and compromise. The right mix of human resources can accommodate shortcomings in other areas of the partnership. However, an inappropriate mix of partners will make success within the partnership difficult. In addition, access to the partnership should be as equitable as possible. Representation which has been delegated by various interest groups will also aid in assuring a degree of validity and accountability for the partnership.

While it is recognized that the degree of formalization required by a partnership will vary depending on the nature and type of arrangement, some degree of supporting documentation should be provided. This formalization may take the form of memoranda of understanding, terms of reference, or legal documentation. Where terms of reference or management plans are provided they should be as specific as possible, identifying accountability mechanisms and evaluation procedures. Furthermore, the goals and objectives of the partnership should reflect the interests of all the partners to ensure their continued commitment to the partnership. If possible, these documents should be developed consensually by all the partners. If this is not possible, acceptance of the terms and conditions of the partnership must

be ensured.

Partnership goals and objectives should be as measureable as possible. While it is sometimes difficult to identify tangible means for assessing the progress of a partnership, participants will respond more favourably to the partnership if they are able to gauge their success in achieving the objectives of the partnership. Some partnerships, such as consultative arrangements, may benefit from the inclusion of operational responsibilities with tangible results within the scope of the agreement.

To ensure the substantive involvement of all the partners, participants should be provided with some initial training where their expertise or understanding of the policy area is lacking. The unfamiliarity of non-governmental partners with the processes and procedures of government often delays the progress of the partnership. Moreover, providing this training communicates to non-governmental partners that government is committed to the endeavour of partnership.

The issue of commitment is significant to all the participants in a partnership. However, it is perhaps most important that government display its commitment so that partners do not perceive the arrangement simply as an opportunity to 'sell government policy' or to discharge government responsibility. Government can illustrate this commitment in tangible ways such as providing financial and human resources, accepting and acting on

recommendations which result from the partnership and delegating real responsibility to the partners.

Lastly, an attempt should be made by government to reduce any inequalities in the power structure of the partnership. It is imperative that all partners perceive that the partnership belongs to them and that they are capable of affecting its outcome. If one partner, namely the government, remains dominant and exercises control over the partnership, the partners will feel ineffectual and, consequently, less committed to the arrangement. Power inequities can be accommodated by providing training to all the partners, sharing resources and information, and adjusting the partnership structure so that the degree of influence exercised by the dominant partner is formally limited.

Demands by the public for a better, more efficient and effective public service have not fallen on deaf ears. While a number of factors have contributed to the recent innovations in public sector management, the current period of fiscal restraint has played an important role in motivating governments to find new ways of doing business. This financial environment is unfortunate in that many innovations pursued by governments may be perceived by the public as an attempt by government to offload its responsibilities. Such has been the case with partnerships. While most of

the participants in these arrangements are satisfied with the outcome of the partnerships and the degree to which they have become involved in policy-making, negative perceptions regarding the government's motivation continue to be held by stakeholders and public officials themselves. Partnerships reflect more than just an opportunity for government to 'do more with less.' They reflect a recognition by government that many of society's problems cross the boundaries between interests and jurisdictions. As a result, the development of solutions to these problems requires the input and expertise of a wide variety of interests. The assumption that government is the sole possessor of knowledge and, therefore, the only entity which can solve extensive problems no longer reflects the realities of life in a global society. We must accept, therefore, a new horizontal approach to problem-solving; an approach which promotes greater levels of public participation and the involvement of various disciplines and interests.

The Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources has displayed its commitment to partnership development in its policy direction and program delivery. While there are clearly areas requiring improvement, this attempt to incorporate a new philosophy for resource management into a departmental strategy is commendable. It is hoped that the current emphasis on partnership continues within this ministry until staff at all levels within the organization embrace both the concept and practice of partnership.

Appendix A

PARTNERSHIPS

WHAT ARE PARTNERSHIPS?

Strict Definition: A formal agreement to share power with others in the pursuit of joint goals and/or mutual benefits.

Broad Definition: A relationship involving the sharing of power, work, support and/or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and/or mutual benefits.

HOW ARE PARTNERSHIPS CLASSIFIED?

Partnerships, while existing in various forms in the private sector, are fairly recent to the field of public administration. There are, however, a number of different classification systems which could be used when identifying specific partnership arrangements. For the purpose of this examination, partnership arrangements will be classified on the basis of the nature and extent of **power** (often in the form of influence) exercised by the partners.

A/ **Collaborative partnerships:** Each partner exercises power in the decision-making process. Ideally, decisions are made by building a consensus. Partners usually are mutually dependent and pool resources such as money, information and labour to reach objectives.

i.e. Co-managed Aboriginal/EIC boards to develop a trained Aboriginal labour force.

- B/ **Consultative partnerships**: Advice is solicited from individuals, groups and organizations outside of government. Little real power-sharing exists as control is usually retained by government. Partners can often exercise substantial influence on government decisions in a variety of ways. These partnerships sometimes evolve into true collaborative partnerships.

i.e. Wawa Remote Tourism Association

- C/ **Operational Partnerships**: Characterized by a sharing of work of a physical or non-physical nature. May share resources. Power (control) usually retained by government but partners usually exercise some degree of influence over one another.

i.e. MNR and private sector share work and expense of conducting fish population surveys.

- D/ **Contributory Partnerships**: Involves the provision of financial or other assistance without operational involvement. Often not considered a true partnership due to lack of decision-making involvement or influence by all players.

i.e. Conservation Officer Centennial Sponsorship

It should be noted that while these category definitions provide a basis for comparison and evaluation of partnership arrangements, in practice, specific arrangements often satisfy the criteria associated with more than one category. In addition, there is a tendency for partnership arrangements to evolve from one type to another as circumstances within the policy environment change.

Appendix B**Questionnaire****Government Partnerships Within The
Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources**

Please provide the following information regarding **one** sample partnership of each type (i.e. decision-making, advisory, etc.) within your District.

Collaborative

Name of Partnership: _____

Purpose of Partnership: _____

Partners Involved: _____

Contact Person: _____

Consultative

Name of Partnership: _____

Purpose of Partnership: _____

Partners Involved: _____

Contact Person: _____

Operational

Name of Partnership: _____

Purpose of Partnership: _____

Partners Involved: _____

Contact Person: _____

Contributory

Name of Partnership: _____

Purpose of Partnership: _____

Partners Involved: _____

Contact Person: _____

Appendix C**Government Partnerships Within The OMNR****Questionnaire - Government Partners****General**

1. What are the objectives and goals of the partnership?
2. Why was the partnership created?
3. Describe the political, social and economic environment within which the partnership was created.
4. How was the partnership created? Who was involved?
5. Describe the policy environment surrounding this particular partnership within the OMNR.

Formalization and Equity

6. Does the partnership have a formal terms of reference or other guidelines? How were they developed and by whom? Do they reflect the interests of all partners?
7. What is the makeup of the partnership? How are members selected? Are all significant stakeholders represented?
8. What influence does each partner bring to the partnership? Are resources being shared by all partners?
9. How are decisions made within the partnership? Do all partners understand and accept this process?
10. Describe the general operation of the partnership. How often do partners meet etc.?

Committment

11. Describe the OMNR's involvement within the partnership.
12. What resource committments have been made to the partnership (i.e. human resources, material, finances)?

13. Is the OMNR generally willing to accept the recommendations resulting from the partnership? How has the partnership been integrated into the formal processes of the OMNR?
14. Are there binding principles or philosophies which all partners share?

Accountability

15. How are decisions made within the partnership? Once a decision or recommendation has been made, what is the next step? Who retains ultimate responsibility for decisions made in or relating to the partnership?
16. What is the reporting relationship between partners? Do all partners clearly understand this relationship as well as the organizational structure within which the partnership functions?
17. What reports (i.e. annual reports, minutes) are submitted to the OMNR by the partnership? Who is responsible for the development and approval of these reports?
18. Do all partners report regularly on the activities of the partnership to the organizations which they represent?

Outcome

19. Are decisions being made in a more consensual way than prior to the partnership?
20. Does the public have a greater level of 'buy in' to OMNR policies and programs since the establishment of the partnership?
21. How successful has the partnership been in achieving its objectives? Has it evolved over time? Are its objectives still valid?
22. Has the partnership met your expectations? Why? Has your attitude regarding the other partners or the policy process itself changed?
23. What factors do you feel are necessary to the maintenance of a successful partnership? What problems has the partnership encountered along the way?
24. Final comments:

Appendix D**PARTNERSHIPS WITHIN THE OMNR****Questionnaire - Non-Government Partners****General**

1. What are the objectives and goals of the partnership?
2. Why was the partnership created?
3. Describe the political, social and economic environment within which the partnership was created.
4. How was the partnership created? Who was involved?
5. What was the nature of your relationship with the OMNR prior to the creation of the partnership? Did you publicly critique OMNR policies on occasion, and if so, to what extent?

Formalization and Equity

6. Does the partnership have a formal terms of reference or other guidelines? How were they developed and by whom? Do they reflect the interests of all partners?
7. What is the makeup of the partnership? How are members selected? Are all significant stakeholders represented?
8. What influence does each partner bring to the partnership? Are resources being shared by all partners?
9. How are decisions made within the partnership? Do all partners understand and accept this process?
10. Describe the general operation of the partnership. How often do partners meet etc.?

Committment

11. Describe the OMNR's involvement within the partnership.
12. What resource committments have been made to the partnership (i.e. human resources, material, finances)?
13. Is the OMNR generally willing to accept the recommendations resulting from the partnership? How has the partnership been integrated into the formal processes of the OMNR?

14. Are there binding principles or philosophies which all partners share?

Accountability

15. How are decisions made within the partnership? Once a decision or recommendation has been made, what is the next step? Who retains ultimate responsibility for decisions made in or relating to the partnership?
16. What is the reporting relationship between partners? Do all partners clearly understand this relationship as well as the organizational structure within which the partnership functions?
17. What reports (i.e. annual reports, minutes) are submitted to the OMNR by the partnership? Who is responsible for the development and approval of these reports?
18. Do all partners report regularly on the activities of the partnership to the organizations which they represent?

Outcome

19. Are decisions being made in a more consensual way than prior to the partnership? Do you perceive yourself as having more input into the policy planning or implementation processes of the OMNR?
20. What is the nature of your relationship with the OMNR now? Has it changed as a result of the partnership?
21. Do you feel the need to criticize OMNR policy now that you are operating within a government partnership? If so, is it easier or more difficult now?
22. Does the public have a greater level of 'buy in' to OMNR policies and programs since the establishment of the partnership?
23. How successful has the partnership been in achieving its objectives? Has it evolved over time? Are its objectives still valid?
24. Has the partnership met your expectations? Why? Has your attitude regarding the other partners or the policy process itself changed?
25. What factors do you feel are necessary to the maintenance of a successful partnership? What problems has the partnership encountered along the way?
26. Final comments:

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS QUESTIONNAIRE

January 7, 1993

DISTRICT	RESPONSE RECEIVED?	DISTRICT	RESPONSE RECEIVED
NORTHWEST REGION:		CENTRAL REGION:	
Dryden District	YES	Algonquin Park District	YES
Fort Frances District	YES	Bancroft District	YES
Geraldton District	YES	North Bay District	YES
Kenora District	YES	Parry Sound District	YES
Nipigon District	YES	Pembroke District	YES
Red Lake District	YES	Sault Ste. Marie District	YES
Sioux Lookout District	YES	Sudbury District	YES
Thunder Bay District	YES	Temagami District	YES
NORTHEAST REGION:		SOUTHERN REGION:	
Chapleau District	YES	Aylmer District	YES
Cochrane District	YES	Cambridge District	YES
Hearst District	NO	Kemptville District	YES
Kirkland Lake District	YES	Maple District	NO
Moosonee District	YES	Midhurst District	YES
Timmins District	YES	Tweed District	YES
Wawa District	YES	LAKES:	
		Superior	YES
		Huron	YES
		Erie	YES
		Ontario	NO

Appendix F

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS

A. Collaborative

District	Partnership	District	Partnership
<u>Northwest Region</u>		<u>Central Region</u>	
FT. FRANCIS	Manitou FMA	ALGONQUIN	Algonquin For. Auth.
GERALDTON	Nakina FAC	PARRY SOUND	Sequin Rec. Trail Bd. of Manitoba
NIPIGON	Rossport Isl. Mgmt. Board	SLT. STE. MARIE	Tupper/Shields Co- Mgmt. Committee
THUNDER BAY	Handicapped Hunting	TEMAGAMI	Wendaban Stewardship Authority
KENORA	Whitedog Area Res. Comm.		
<u>Northeast Region</u>		<u>Southern Region</u>	
CHAPLEAU	Superior For. FMA	AYLMER	West Sydenhan Valley Mgmt. Area
COCHRANE	Kesagami Prov. Park	CAMBRIDGE	Gypsy Moth Tripartite Prog.
TIMMINS	Romeo Mallette FMA	KEMPTVILLE	East Ont. Forestry Devel. Prog.
MOOSONEE	Habitat Based Wildlife Assessmt. Subarc. Cst.*	TWEED	Bass Conserv. Zones
<u>Lakes</u>			
SUPERIOR	Community Act. Prog.		
HURON	Lk. Huron Liaison Comm.		

NOT YET RECATEGORIZED: MIDHURST: Dufferin Cnty. Agreement Forest

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS

B. Consultative

District	Partnership	District	Partnership
<u>Northwest Region</u>		<u>Central Region</u>	
FT. FRANCIS	Fish. Advisory Committee	ALGONQUIN	Leaseholders Assoc. of Algonquin Park
NIPIGON	Steel River Crn. Mgmt. Unit Public Advisory Committee	NORTH BAY	Local Citizens Comm.
THUNDER BAY	Lac des Milles Lacs Advisory Committee	PARRY SOUND	Blackstone Harbour Prov. Park Advisory Committee
RED LAKE	Trout Lake Co-Mgmt. Group	PEMBROKE	Ottawa Valley Sawmillers Assoc.*
SIOUX LOOKOUT	M.A.P.B. Committee	SLT.STE.MARIE	Local Citizens Comm.
KENORA	Aulneau Wildlife Peninsula Mgmt.Grp.	SUDBURY	VETAC Sudbury
		TEMAGAMI	Temagami Trails
<u>Northeast Region</u>		<u>Southern Region</u>	
TIMMINS	District Advisory Comm.	AYLMER	James Berry Drain Demonstration
WAWA	Magpie Co-Mgmt.Committee	CAMBRIDGE	Remedial Action Plan for Welland River
KIRKLAND LAKE	Elk Lake Community Forest	MIDHURST	SevenSound Public Advisory Committee
CHAPLEAU	Biscotasing Public Advisory Committee	TWEED	Bay of Quinte RAP
<u>Lakes</u>			
SUPERIOR	Lk. Sup. Advisory Comm.	ERIE	Lk.Erie Committee
HURON	Lk. Huron Advisory Comm.		

* May overlap into other categories

MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS

C. Operational

District	Partnership	District	Partnership
<u>Northwest Region</u>		<u>Central Region</u>	
FT. FRANCIS	CFIP **	ALGONQUIN	Friends of Algon.
NIPIGON	Peregrine Falcon Release Program	NORTH BAY	Sturgeon Fish Recovery Prog.
THUNDER BAY	Trout Lake Waste Mgmt. Site	PARRY SOUND	Healy Lake Cottager Association
RED LAKE	CFIP Walleye Trans.*	PEMBROKE	Algonquin College Education Program
DRYDEN	Eagle Lake Conserv. Group*	SUDBURY	Peregrin Falcon Release Program
KENORA	Wabaseemoong Garb. Dump	TEMAGAMI	Project Canoe
		BANCROFT	Fed. Ont. Cottagers
<u>Northeast Region</u>		<u>Southern Region</u>	
TIMMINS	Bd. of Education Environ. Awareness	AYLMER	Long Point Mgmt. Unit
KIRKLAND LAKE	Eastern Habit. Joint Venture	CAMBRIDGE	Landowner/Steward. Initiatives
CHAPLEAU	Chapleau Boy Scouts CFIP *	MIDHURST	Tree Planting Cons. Authority
COCHRANE	Abitibi Model Forest	TWEED	Friends of Camden Lake
<u>Lakes</u>		ERIE	Aerial Sport Fishing Survey
SUPERIOR	Lake Herring Assessmt.		
HURON	Lake Huron Technical Committee		

* May overlap other categories

**Depending on degree of operational involvement of MNR


MINISTRY OF NATURAL RESOURCES PARTNERSHIPS

D. Contributory

District	Partnership	District	Partnership
<u>Northwest Region</u>		<u>Central Region</u>	
FT. FRANCIS	Moose/Deerhide Collection Prog.	ALGONQUIN	Fund Raising with Private Sector
THUNDER BAY	Moose Hunter Educ/ Rifle Sight-in*	NORTH BAY	Lk.Nipissing & Conservation
		PARRY SOUND	Nature Club
		SLT.STE.MARIE	Operation Tree Plant
<u>Northeast Region</u>		TEMAGAMI	Temagami Fishing Maps
TIMMINS	Education Forest Laboratory		
<u>Lakes</u>		<u>Southern Region</u>	
SUPERIOR	Remedial Action Plan	CAMBRIDGE	CFIP & CWIP *
		MIDHURST	Fisheries Stream Improve. Rehab.**
		TWEED	Fish Habitat Mapping CFIP*

* may overlap into other categories

**depending on degree of operational involvement of MNR

SOCIOGRAM:**SITUATION AS IT EXISTS IN THE MAGPIE FOREST**

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